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Abstract 
This study presents a theoretical model that links chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to the 
value loss of corporate diversification. Consistent with the model’s prediction, the findings show that 
diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs experience value loss compared to diversified firms run 
by their rational counterparts. Empirically, the value loss is economically significant and ranges 
between 12.5% and 14.1%. In addition, the model predicts heightened corporate refocusing activity by 
overconfident CEOs who pursued diversified investments in the past once realized returns fail to match 
initial expectations. The empirical odds of corporate refocusing decisions are 67% to 98% higher when 
past diversifications are undertaken by overconfident rather than rational CEOs. Another prediction of 
the model is that overconfident CEOs exhibit preference for diversified investments, especially in the 
presence of ample internal funds. This prediction is also strongly supported by the data. Overall, this 
study proposes CEO overconfidence as a unified and consistent explanation of why firms pursue value-
destructive corporate diversification policies and later adopt refocusing policies aiming to restore value. 
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Psychologists are constantly bombarding economists with empirical evidence 
that individuals do not always make rational decisions under uncertainty. 
                  —Roll (1986, p. 199) 
I. Introduction 
Recent literature examines how managerial overconfidence affects corporate decision making 
(e.g. Malmendier and Tate (2005), Aktas et al. (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), Ben-David et al. (2013)). 
This literature builds on the biased tendency of overconfident individuals to overestimate their own 
judgment, ability, and knowledge when comparing themselves to their rational peers (e.g. Langer 
(1975), Svenson (1981), Larrick (1993), Alicke et al. (1995), Moore and Cain (2007), Moore et al. 
(2008)). Overconfidence induces chief executive officer (CEOs) to overrate the added value of new 
investment projects and to underrate the likelihood of failure. Overconfident CEOs therefore tend to 
overinvest relative to the first–best choice, especially when they are not constrained by internal funds 
and thus drive firm size above the optimal level, a decision that can have adverse valuation implications 
for their firms (Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Malmendier and Tate (2008)). This study builds on prior 
literature and expands on the theoretical model of Malmendier and Tate (2005; MT hereafter) to offer 
a CEO overconfidence–based explanation of why firms initially pursue value-destructive corporate 
diversification policies followed later by corporate refocusing decisions, which aim to restore value. 
While prior literature has examined the benefits and costs arising from corporate 
diversification, no consensus has emerged despite the different theories that have been developed to 
explain the puzzling evidence that diversified corporations trade at lower valuations relative to a 
portfolio of focused corporations (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995)).1 A sizable strand 
of the literature suggests that distorted investment decisions in the form of corporate diversifications 
could be the result of misalignment of managerial and shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). Diversified firms destroy value because they appear to incubate entrenched managers who 
diversify at the expense of shareholders to reap private benefits, such as perks and compensation (Jensen 
and Murphy (1990)), power and prestige (Jensen (1986), Villalonga (2000)), and better career prospects 
                                                          
1 For an insightful review of the conflicting value-related findings of corporate diversification, see Martin and 
Sayrak (2003), Stein (2003), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2007). 
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(Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Stulz (1990)), and to reduce their own employment risks (Amihud and 
Lev (1981)).2,3 Given these explanations, diversified firms appear to have lower valuations (i.e. exhibit 
a diversification discount) because their managers either overinvest and grow their firms beyond the 
optimal size (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003)) or because they pursue the creation of an internal 
capital market, which is not necessarily efficient or beneficial (e.g. Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and 
Stein (2000), Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010)).4 Although they offer a variety of important insights, these 
theoretical arguments mainly focus on agency problems that arise from (rational) managers’ self-
interested strategies. Fundamentally, however, they do not consider that the benefits and costs of 
diversification could depend on biases, such as overconfidence, that vary with the psychological 
characteristics of the CEO. 
This study contributes to this literature by proposing CEO overconfidence as an explanation for 
the relatively lower valuations of diversified firms. We argue that the so-called corporate diversification 
discount phenomenon is mostly associated with diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs. We 
support this claim through a theoretical model that builds on the work of MT. Those authors formalize 
the idea that distortions in corporate investment policies (i.e. overinvestment), given a pre-existing 
capital structure, are associated with CEO overconfidence. Nevertheless, the MT model elaborates only 
on the relation between CEO overconfidence and aggregate firm investment activity and does not 
explicitly allow for the possibility that CEOs can engage in intra-industry (focused) or inter-industry 
(diversified) investments. We expand the MT model to account for CEOs’ desire to invest outside the 
firm’s core business, which arises because the deployment of more capital resources to the firm’s 
focused business leads to diminishing returns. Accordingly, overconfident CEOs exhibit not only 
excessive willingness to overinvest but also an overly large appetite to diversify to avoid the diminishing 
                                                          
2 Potential benefits from diversification arise, for instance, from economies of scope (Teece (1980), Teece (1982), 
Matsusaka (2001)), debt coinsurance effects (Lewellen (1971), Stein (2003)), internal capital markets (Stein 
(1997)), and fewer failures in product, labor, and financial markets (Khanna and Palepu (2000)). 
3 For the value destruction impact of corporate diversification, see, for instance, Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger 
and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), Lins and Servaes (1999), Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and 
Hoechle et al. (2012).  
4 Recent studies, however, question the presence of the diversification discount and suggest that the lower 
valuations of diversified firms are illusory and the outcome of methodological problems; see, for instance, Whited 
(2001), Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham et al. (2002), Mansi and Reeb (2002), Villalonga (2004a, 2004b), 
Glaser and Müller (2010), and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015). 
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returns of focused investments. Since overconfident CEOs pursue diversified investments more often 
than their rational counterparts, our theoretical arguments imply that the investment quality is reduced, 
which, in turn, results in lower average firm valuations due to excessive and unsuccessful diversified 
investment activity. In addition, our theoretical framework incorporates other stylized facts of prior 
studies suggesting that both rational and overconfident CEOs do learn about the prospects of their own 
firms from the information contained in stock prices (e.g. Aktas et al. (2009, 2011), Dow and Gorton 
(1997)). In this respect, a novel proposition of our model is that overconfident CEOs are also expected 
to undertake more corrective actions through corporate refocusing strategies by reversing their past 
failed diversified investments. 
To empirically investigate the value-related implications of our theory, we link CEO 
overconfidence to the valuation of diversified firms using a time-series econometric approach that 
enables the comparison of firm value before and after the first decision to diversify. Hence, this analysis 
can be considered resilient to both the endogenous nature of the diversification decision (Campa and 
Kedia (2002)) and potential measurement errors related to the computation of firm value (Villalonga 
(2004a)). To gauge CEO overconfidence, we use two proxies. Following MT, the first proxy is based 
on CEOs’ personal overinvestment in firm stock and the second is based on the portrayal of the CEO 
in the news media, following Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Malmendier and Tate (2008). Consistent with 
the main prediction of our model, the findings show that overconfident CEOs exhibit a heightened 
tendency to carry out more corporate diversification decisions than their rational peers, especially in the 
presence of sufficient internal funds. These decisions destroy value; following the first incidence of 
diversification, diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs realize economically lower valuations 
ranging from 12.5% to 14.1% when compared to firms run by rational CEOs. 
Our model further posits that overconfident CEOs who pursue diversified investments are more 
likely to adopt refocusing policies to restore firm value than their rational counterparts.5 Consistent with 
this prediction, the results show that the odds of refocusing decisions are 67% to 98% higher when past 
diversification decisions are made by overconfident rather than rational CEOs. 
                                                          
5 Prior empirical work (e.g. Berger and Ofek (1999)) considers refocusing decisions to be value-increasing 
policies, since they largely relate to the unwinding of past value-destructive diversified investments. 
5 
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it extends the theory of MT to 
explicitly model the CEO decision making process in the context of corporate diversification. In this 
regard, it allows for investment activity outside the firm’s core business, due to diminishing returns that 
arise when CEOs deploy excessive capital on existing assets. More importantly, our model relaxes the 
assumption of CEO risk neutrality, a focal point of MT. By incorporating CEO risk preferences, the 
model predicts that, compared to rational CEOs who appear to invest at the first-best level and expand 
to the first-best number of diversified projects, overconfident CEOs engage in more diversified 
investments that destroy firm value. Furthermore, the model accounts for managerial learning pertaining 
to the valuation outcome of past corporate decisions. Using such a multi-period setting enable us to 
assess whether overconfident CEOs acknowledge investors’ stock market valuation signals through a 
dynamic adjustment of corporate policies, that is, by reversing (or not) failed diversified investments 
made in the past. A prominent implication of this setting is that learning is, nonetheless, unable to 
eventually turn an overconfident CEO into a rational one, which is a very intriguing outcome, since it 
aligns well with evidence that considers managerial overconfidence to be habitual (and not transitory) 
CEO trait.6 In this respect, our study offers novel insights and complements prior research that has 
addressed CEO learning in different contexts (e.g. Luo (2005), Chen et al. (2007), Kau et al. (2008), 
Aktas et al. (2009)). 
Second, this study contributes to the empirical literature documenting that diversified firms 
appear to have, on average, lower valuations compared to a portfolio of standalone firms (Lang and 
Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995)) by offering an unconventional explanation based on CEO 
psychological traits. By documenting that overconfident CEOs show a heightened tendency to 
undertake more diversification decisions than their rational peers, we point out the underlying channel 
through which CEO overconfidence destroys firm value. This result, thus supports the conceptual 
conjectures of Roll (1986) and the laboratory evidence of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) using realistic 
conditions whereby overconfident and rational CEOs have certain risk preferences. Furthermore, the 
proposed explanation for corporate diversification activity complements other prominent explanations 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, the seminal work of Malmendier and Tate (2005, p. 2672), whose overconfidence CEO 
measures target the permanent rather than transitory CEO overconfidence effect. 
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that rely on suboptimal decision making, such as agency problems (Stein (1997), Villalonga (2000), 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), Stein (2003)). Finally, although many recent studies have investigated 
the implications of overconfident CEOs on firms’ policies and organizational outcomes (e.g. Campbell 
et al. (2011), Gervais et al., (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012)), this study primarily links CEO 
overconfidence to the value of diversified firms. 
Third, the theoretical propositions and empirical evidence support the idea that CEO 
overconfidence can serve as a unified and consistent explanation for two strands of the literature that 
investigate, mostly independently, the questions of why firms diversify (e.g. Lewellen (1971), Stein 
(1997), Villalonga (2000), Matsusaka (2001), Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), Stein (2003)) and why 
firms refocus (e.g. Comment and Jarrel (1995), John and Ofek (1995), Berger and Ofek (1996, 1999)). 
In particular, the finding that corporate refocusing decisions relate to past diversification decisions made 
by overconfident CEOs implies that corporate refocusing decisions are motivated by the value losses 
from poor past diversified investment decisions. 
Finally, this study relates to the growing strand of behavioural corporate finance literature by 
empirically connecting CEO overconfidence to value-decreasing investments through corporate 
diversification decisions and to value-increasing disinvestments through corporate refocusing actions. 
Our findings shed empirical light on theoretical arguments according to which sufficiently high 
managerial overconfidence generates overinvestment that subsequently decreases firm value (Goel and 
Thakor (2008)). Moreover, the study complements that of Malmendier and Tate (2008), who provide 
evidence that CEO overconfidence increases merger frequency and induces weaker short-term market 
reactions to merger announcements, especially diversifying acquisitions. While Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) use diversifying acquisitions as a proxy for value destruction, this study, instead, relies on 
realized corporate diversification decisions and the subsequent value destruction associated with this 
policy. 
 The study proceeds as follows. Section II describes the model. Section III describes the data 
and measures. Section IV discusses the empirical results. Section V concludes the paper. 
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II. The Model 
This study proposes a two-period model that shows the impact of overconfidence on the type 
and effectiveness of corporate investments in an efficient capital market. The model is an extension to 
MT and aims to demonstrate the investment distortion effect of overconfidence on corporate 
diversification and to link this effect to subsequent corporate refocusing. We assume that the CEO 
maximizes current shareholder wealth. Initially, the only friction in the model arises from a CEO’s 
inflated perception of the true returns from investment. Then, we also allow the CEO to be optimistic 
about the return on the firm’s assets. Further, we allow the CEO to have certain risk preferences (i.e. 
we relax the risk-neutral assumption). 
Consider a firm with assets 𝐴, initial cash holdings 𝐶, and 𝑠 shares outstanding. There is a 
continuum of differentiated projects 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] a producer can undertake. Unlike the model of MT, the 
CEO’s decision is twofold. The CEO jointly decides on the number of projects 𝑁 to launch and the 
amount to invest in each sector 𝐼𝑖. For simplicity, we assume that each project has the same return on 
investment and the CEO therefore chooses the same investment level for all projects, allowing us to 
drop the subscript 𝑖.7 Further, we assume that the projects’ returns are initially identical. 
The return on each investment project, 𝑅(𝐼), is increasing in the investment level (𝑅′(𝐼) > 0) 
and exhibits diminishing returns (𝑅′′(𝐼) < 0). Assuming that 𝐸(. ) is the expectations operator, the 
perceived return on each project for a firm’s CEO is 𝐸𝑅(𝐼) = 𝑅(𝐼)(1 + ∆). The difference between 
rational and overconfident CEOs is that ∆ = 0 for rational CEOs, implying that overconfident managers 
overestimate the true return of their projects by a magnitude of ∆ > 0. 
As in MT, investment costs can be financed through 1) cash 𝑐, which can be as large an amount 
as the firm’s initial cash holdings, so that 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶; 2) risk-free debt 𝑑 (at an interest rate of one), which 
is the debt that a firm can accumulate up to an amount 𝐷, where debt capacity is restricted by the 
                                                          
7 If each project’s return is a draw from a distribution, this will not affect the results because this does not change 
the ranking of the relative investment responses of overconfident and rational CEOs. Heterogeneity in investment 
projects would imply heterogeneous investments in each project. However, what we are concerned about is that, 
for each project, the overconfident CEO overinvests compared to the rational CEO. Therefore, we could just as 
well assume that all projects are the same for this experiment. 
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collateral value of a firm’s assets and, therefore, 𝐴 > 𝐷; and 3) a new shares issue, which implies that 
the amount of internal cash and debt together, 𝑐 + 𝑑, is not enough to finance the new investment. 
Moreover, investing in different sectors (i.e. outside of the firm’s core industry) involves an 
entry cost 𝐹(𝑁). This cost can be interpreted as the cost to maintain competitiveness in 𝑁 businesses 
that could involve preparation, advertising, legal costs, accounting and auditing costs, input 
transformation, research and development (R&D), and/or all extra costs necessary to allow a firm to 
compete in a certain industry. The cost is increasing in the number of projects 𝑁 and, therefore, 𝐹′(. ) >
0. Further, the marginal cost of additional business expansion is increasing (𝐹′′(. ) > 0), insinuating that 
rapid expansion to many sectors at once is less appealing. Therefore, the total cost of investment each 
period is 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁).8 
The CEO solves the following constrained optimization problem: 
 max
{𝐼,𝑠′,𝑐,𝑑,𝑁}
𝑠
𝑠 + 𝑠′
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑] (1) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.       
𝑠′
𝑠 + 𝑠′
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑] = 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑 (2) 
 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶, 𝑑 ≤ 𝐷, 𝑐 + 𝑑 ≤ 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) (3) 
 𝑐 ≥ 0, 𝑑 ≥ 0, 𝑁 ≥ 0 (4) 
where 𝑠 and 𝑠′ are the numbers of current shares and shares next period, respectively. The first 
constraint, equation (2), simply states that the amount financed through a new shares issue (left-hand 
side) should be equal to the value of the firm that belongs to the new shareholders (right-hand side). In 
the objective function, equation (1), of the overconfident CEO, the returns are exaggerated by Δ. 
However, the first constraint, equation (2), reveals that the CEO understands that outside investors do 
not share the same confidence regarding the firm’s expansion. The return in the constraint is the true 
                                                          
8 We treat both investment I and sectors N is as if they were sunk costs. We treat I as the cost of variable inputs 
necessary to implement a project and N as those variable inputs necessary to maintain competitiveness in N 
different sectors. Alternatively, if we assume that these variables can be accumulated, the model would treat I and 
N as state variables and their initial values would also be necessary for the solution. The accumulated investment 
would then increase asset holdings 𝐴𝑡+1 next period. However, since our concern is the comparison between 
overconfident and rational managers, this formulation adds nothing different from our benchmark specification.  
Therefore, for the rest of the model and without loss of generality, we assume that the firm starts with a zero 
investment level and initially operates in a measure of zero sectors/projects, that is, 𝑁0 = 0. 
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return (∆ = 0), which is what the new shareholders expect to receive if they invest in the firm. 
Therefore, when deciding to use external funds, the CEO should also consider that the new shareholders 
demand a larger share of the pie than what the CEO deems fair. Constraint set (3) imposes bounds on 
the control variables and constraint set (4) includes non-negativity constraints. 
Definition 1: The (first-best) level of investment 𝐼𝐹𝐵 satisfies 𝑅
′(𝐼𝐹𝐵) = 1 and the (first-best) number 
of sectors 𝑁𝐹𝐵 satisfies 𝐹
′(𝑁𝐹𝐵) = 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝐼𝐹𝐵. 
Definition 2: The level of investment 𝐼 satisfies 𝑅′(𝐼) =
1
1+∆
 and the number of sectors ?̂? 
satisfies 𝐹′(?̂?) = (1 + ∆)𝑅(𝐼) − 𝐼. 
Definition 3: The level of investment 𝐼 ̅satisfies 𝑅′(𝛪)̅ =
1
1+∆𝛷
 and the number of sectors ?̅? 
satisfies 𝐹′(?̅?) = (1 + ∆𝛷)𝑅(𝛪)̅ − 𝛪 ̅for some 𝛷 > 0. 
The following proposition highlights the relative efficiency of a rational manager’s decisions compared 
to an overconfident one. All proofs are included in Appendix A. 
Proposition 1: If 𝑅(. ) is concave, 𝐹(. ) is convex, 𝐼∗ is the optimal level of investment, and 𝑁∗ is the 
optimal number of projects to launch, then a) a rational CEO (∆ = 0) chooses 𝐼∗ = 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and 𝑁
∗ =
𝑁𝐹𝐵 for all 𝐶 and 𝐷 and b) an overconfident CEO (∆ > 0) chooses 𝐼
∗ = 𝐼 ̅and 𝑁∗ = ?̅? > 𝑁𝐹𝐵 for all 
𝐶 and 𝐷 such that 𝐶 + 𝐷 < ?̂?𝐼 + 𝐹(?̂?), with 𝐼∗ = 𝐼 > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and 𝑁
∗ = ?̂? > 𝑁𝐹𝐵 for all 𝐶 and 𝐷 such 
that 𝐶 + 𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐼 + 𝐹(?̂?). 
The rational CEO invests in each project at the first-best level and expands to the first-best number of 
projects, irrespective of initial cash holdings or debt capacity, whereas the overconfident CEO 
overinvests in both the number of projects and the amount allocated to each individual project. 
Nevertheless, the overconfident CEO tends to exaggerate investment the higher the firm’s stock of cash 
is, leaving the firm more sensitive to its own cash flow. 
Lemma 1: If 𝐶 + 𝐷 < ?̂?𝐼 + 𝐹(?̂?), which implies overconfident CEOs are cash constrained, and 
𝑅(. ) is concave and 𝐹(. ) is convex, then 𝐼 > 𝐼 ̅ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and ?̂? > ?̅? > 𝑁𝐹𝐵. 
Lemma 1 claims that cash-constrained overconfident CEOs tend to overinvest, albeit at a lower 
magnitude than cash-rich ones. On the other hand, overconfident CEOs who can carry out the whole 
investment plan with their own funds tend to overinvest more heavily. The following proposition 
demonstrates that cash-constrained overconfident CEOs overinvest more the higher the firm’s initial 
stock of cash is. 
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Proposition 2: Let 𝑅(. ) be concave and 𝐹(. ) convex. Then a) for a rational CEO (∆ = 0), 𝐼∗ and 𝑁∗ 
are independent of initial cash holdings 𝐶 for all 𝐶 and 𝐷, and b) for an overconfident CEO (∆ > 0), 
𝐼∗ = 𝐼 and 𝑁∗ = ?̂? are independent of initial cash holdings 𝐶, for all 𝐶 + 𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐼 + 𝐹(?̂?), and is 
strictly increasing in 𝐶 for all 𝐶 + 𝐷 < ?̂?𝐼 + 𝐹(?̂?). 
A rational CEO is not concerned about the financing method, adhering to the Modigliani–Miller 
theorem. However, overconfident CEOs seeking finance through the capital market face a conflict: 
solving for 𝑠′ in constraint (2), that is, 
 𝑠′ = 𝑠
𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁)− 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴+ 𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝑁𝐼 − 𝐹(𝑁)
  
This equation shows the number of shares that should be offered to new shareholders for their 
contribution to the investment undertaken by the firm, which is 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑. In the eyes of the 
overconfident manager, the new shares issue to finance the same investment should have been 
 𝑠′ = 𝑠
𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁)− 𝑐− 𝑑
𝐴+ 𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ)−𝑁𝐼 − 𝐹(𝑁)
< 𝑠′  
Therefore, the overconfident CEO believes that the shares of the firm are more diluted than necessary. 
This induces the cash-constrained overconfident manager to use as much cash and debt available 
(thus 𝑐 = 𝐶 and 𝑑 = 𝐷) to rely as little as possible on new investor funding. This is basically the reason 
all individual investment and diversification decisions are increasing in cash holdings 𝐶. The greater 
the cash available to the CEO, the greater the scale of diversification. 
This argument also sheds new light on Lemma 1. An overconfident manager who needs external 
funding would keep the issuance of new shares as moderate as possible, holding diversification to a 
minimum, whereas an overconfident manager with the ability to undertake the entire new investment 
through internal funding would be in favour of greater diversification. Thus, equity-dependent firms 
that consider diversification are more cash sensitive than any other firms. 
Next, we investigate the diversification decisions of an overconfident CEO who is optimistic 
not only about the true return but also about the return on the assets of firm 𝐴. This excessive optimism 
could be exacerbated if the overconfident CEO contributed to the accumulation and management of 
those assets. We assume that the overconfident CEO estimates the next period’s return on the firm’s 
assets to be 𝐴(1 + 𝛥𝐴), where 𝐴 is the true value of the assets. A CEO with insufficient internal funds 
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needs to rely on new shareholders to fund part or all of the cost of the project; therefore, 𝐶 + 𝐷 <
𝑁∗𝐼∗ + 𝐹(𝑁∗). 
Lemma 2: Suppose that an overconfident CEO does not hold sufficient internal funds, that is, 𝐶 + 𝐷 <
𝑁∗𝐼∗ + 𝐹(𝑁∗), and estimates the return to each project as 𝑅(𝐼)(1 + 𝛥) and the return on assets as 
𝐴(1 + 𝛥𝐴), where 𝛥 > 0 and 𝛥𝐴 > 0. Then the CEO overinvests (𝐼
∗ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵) when 𝛥 >
𝐴
𝐴−𝐷
𝛥𝐴 and 
underinvests (𝐼∗ < 𝐼𝐹𝐵) when 𝛥 <
𝐴
𝐴−𝐷
𝛥𝐴. 
Lemma 2 highlights the behaviour of a CEO with insufficient internal funds. If the CEO overestimates 
the true returns from investments and diversification, the CEO tends to overinvest, even if part of the 
cost is funded through a new shares issue, inducing share capital dilution. Nonetheless, if the CEO 
overestimates both the returns on investment and the return on the firm’s assets, then the CEO’s 
behaviour can potentially be reversed. For example, suppose the CEO overestimates the true return on 
assets and, to a lesser extent, the true investment returns; then the CEO underinvests compared to the 
rational CEO. In such a case, the CEO is reluctant to hand out as many new shares to the new 
shareholders, because they are entitled to the firm’s assets that the CEO considers to be undervalued. 
The CEO thus feels that the new shareholders are being overcompensated with an extra return to whose 
determination they do not contribute at all. 
Lemma 3: If risk is introduced by transforming the return function to 𝑅(𝐼; 𝑧) = 𝑧𝑅(𝐼), where 
𝑧 ~ 𝑁(1, 𝜎𝑟
2), CEOs are risk averse and, if the overconfident CEO either overestimates the return (∆ >
0) or underestimates the project’s risk (𝜎2 < 𝜎𝑟
2), the results in Propositions 1 and 2 still hold. 
For an overconfident CEO, a lower 𝜎2 value induces the exact same effect as a higher ∆. If the 
overconfident CEO differs from the rational CEO by either a positive ∆ or a lower 𝜎2 (since 𝜎2 < 𝜎𝑟
2), 
aversion to external financing works precisely the same way. The difference between cash-rich and 
cash-poor firms is governed by how CEOs perceive the compensation to outside funding and 
overconfident CEOs – by either overestimating the mean return or underestimating the variance –
believe they should compensate outside investors with a price 𝑃𝑠 > 1 for each dollar those investors 
bring in for the firm. Since outside investors perceive greater risk, they demand more generous 
compensation in shares for every dollar they bring in and thus the overconfident CEO is inclined to rely 
more on the firm’s own funds for investment. 
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Lemma 4: If the model is extended for another period and CEOs update their beliefs through an 
adaptive learning algorithm, corporate refocusing is more likely to relate to past diversifications made 
by overconfident CEOs. 
Both rational and overconfident CEOs are likely to learn and reduce the degree of diversification by 
refocusing, if the expansion undertaken is above the optimal level.9 Therefore, since overconfident 
CEOs overestimate the expected returns of projects, the feedback they receive from the realized returns 
is more likely to encourage divestment. In this spirit, we expect that, as CEOs learn from their past 
diversification mistakes, they most likely attempt to reduce the amount of diversification by 
refocusing.10 
 
III. Data and Measures 
A. Sample 
To construct our sample, we relied on several data sources. We use the Center for Research in 
Security Prices to obtain market prices; Standard & Poor’s Compustat Industrial Segment and 
Compustat Industrial Annual databases to obtain segment- and accounting-related information, 
respectively; S&P’s ExecuComp to access information about CEOs, and Factiva to retrieve CEO press 
characterizations. Following prior corporate diversification literature (Aerger and Ofek (1995), Campa 
and Kedia (2002)), we exclude firm–years where firms report segments in the financial sector (Standard 
Industrial Classification codes 6000–6999), with sales of less than $20 million, and where the sum of 
segment sales is not within 1% of the firm’s total sales. We also exclude firm–years missing data on 
                                                          
9 Learning, for instance through market signals is a reasonable assumption for two main reasons: first, prior 
literature shows that poor firm performance is a main determinant of CEO turnover (Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998), Lehn and Zhao (2006)). Thus, given the well-established negative economic and human capital (personal 
careers) consequences for non-performing (Eckbo et al. (2016)) and fired CEOs, it is reasonable to assume that 
CEOs care about firm performance and respond accordingly to restore shareholders’ confidence about the firm’s 
prospects through corrective corporate decisions such as refocusing. Second, prior theoretical literature in 
corporate finance assumes that market signals contain information produced by trades that do not have channels 
of communication with the firm outside of the trading process (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Subrahmanyam 
and Titman (1999)). Empirically, Chen et al. (2006) show that this information guides managers when making 
corporate decisions.  
10 If learning induces the underlying beliefs to move from high to lower returns, CEOs are more likely to refocus 
if the diversification is undertaken by an overconfident CEO. For the results in this paper to reverse, learning must 
operate in such a way that, after an episode of overconfidence, beliefs converge to rational beliefs in an oscillatory 
manner, bouncing from extreme optimism to extreme pessimism along the way. However, the literature on 
learning expectations reveals that agents tend to approach the true parameter without oscillations. 
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both the dependent and control variables. In addition, we require data on at least one of our 
overconfidence measures. Because we use a one-period lag for the overconfidence measures, we also 
require the same CEO over any two consecutive periods. A description of the CEO overconfidence 
measures follows and detailed information about the control variables is in Appendix B. 
The final sample covers the period from 1993 to 2010. We start our analysis in 1993 instead of 
1992, which is the start year for ExecuComp, since we observe that the first year of data of this database 
is rather incomplete and tends to underrepresent S&P 1500 firms. We end our investigation in 2010 
because our analysis includes a press-based CEO overconfidence measure that exploits hand-collected 
information from financial press articles retrieved using the Factiva database going back to 1980. 
Collecting this information for a 30-year period is a daunting and very time-consuming process that 
commanded a great deal of human effort to meticulously complete. 
 
B. CEO Overconfidence Measures 
Measuring CEO overconfidence empirically presents a great challenge, since it is a salient 
feature of CEO behaviour that cannot be observed directly. Our objective is therefore to rely on CEO 
overconfidence measures that have been successfully applied in previous seminal studies. In that vein, 
we use a net buyer–based measure of overconfidence following the rationale of MT, as well as a press-
based measure of overconfidence following the rationale of Hirshleifer et al. (2012). These measures 
have been widely used by other important studies, such as those of Malmendier and Tate (2008), 
Malmendier et al. (2011), Campbell et al., (2011) and Hribar et al. (2015). An important feature of these 
CEO overconfidence measures is that they are meant to capture the permanent (rather than transitory) 
overconfidence effect. They are therefore consistent with the notion that CEO overconfidence is a 
habitual characteristic, as postulated in the seminal works of Roll (1986) and MT, and coincide with 
the theoretical arguments as predicted by the model presented in this study. 
First, we draw upon MT to create the net buyer–based measure of overconfidence 
(NET_BUYER_OC). This measure exploits the tendency of certain CEOs to increase exposure to their 
firm stock despite their already high exposure to idiosyncratic risk. An increase of exposure to firm 
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stock occurs when a CEO is a net buyer, that is, the CEO buys more stocks than what sells during a 
year. Following MT, we classify CEOs as overconfident during their entire tenure if they were net 
buyers of firm equity during their first five years in our sample, that is, they bought stock on net in more 
years than they sold on net during their first five sample years. Information about CEO exposure to 
stocks is obtained from ExecuComp. Using the net buyer proxy of CEO overconfidence, we obtain a 
final sample of 1,360 firms, with 8,262 firm–year observations. 
We do not have specific information on whether changes in the stocks owned by CEOs 
(excluding options) are driven by stocks that CEOs keep after exercising vested options and/or stocks 
they buy from the open market. Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that most executives sell stocks acquired 
through the exercise of vested options. Thus, changes in the percentage of stock owned by CEOs, 
excluding options, should largely reflect additional purchases of stocks from the open market. To 
complement our approach, we re-estimate the net buyer measure after subtracting the number of stocks 
acquired by exercising options during the year. Assuming that CEOs keep rather than sell these stocks, 
this alternative measure is calculated based on stock purchases from the open market. In additional tests, 
we also exclude the first five years of CEO tenure. Although this approach mitigates endogeneity 
concerns, it also substantially reduces sample size. Nonetheless, the results using these alternative 
definitions of net buyer are qualitatively similar to those reported using the main measure. 
Second, following Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we use a press-based measure of CEO 
overconfidence relying on hand-collected information from financial media press articles (PRESS_OC). 
In particular, we search for articles on Factiva by keywords, using the CEOs’ names or variants thereof 
during their tenure period, in the following financial media: The New York Times, Business Week, 
Financial Times, The Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Fortune, Forbes, Dow Jones 
Business News, and Dow Jones Online News. Information about the name and tenure of CEOs is 
obtained from ExecuComp. For each CEO and year, we record the total number of relevant articles with 
the following information: (i) articles containing the words confident and confidence or variants such 
as overconfidence and over-confident, (ii) the number of articles containing the words optimistic and 
optimism or variants such as overoptimistic and over-optimism, (iii) the number of articles using 
pessimistic and pessimism or variants such as over-pessimistic, and (iv) the number of articles using 
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cautious, reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, not confident, or not optimistic or variants 
such as non-confident and non-optimistic. Each article was carefully read to verify that the context of 
confident/optimistic or pessimistic/cautious characterizations was used appropriately and was only 
relevant to the CEO and firm of interest. 
Our financial press–based overconfidence measure classifies a CEO as overconfident if the 
number of press articles describing the manager as confident/optimistic exceeds the number of articles 
describing the manager as pessimistic/cautious. In particular, we compare the number of articles that 
use the confident/optimistic terms as captured by categories (i) and (ii) and articles that use the 
pessimistic/cautious terms as captured by categories (iii) and (iv) and measure CEO overconfidence for 
each CEO i in year t as 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
{
 
 1 𝑖𝑓 ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑡
𝑖=1
>∑𝐶𝐴𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑡
𝑞=1 
   0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                                     
 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑗 is the number of articles using confident terms and 𝐶𝐴𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the number of articles 
using cautious terms. Our press-based measure cumulates articles starting from the first year the CEO 
is in office. ExecuComp provides data from 1992 and onwards and reports the hiring date of each CEO. 
From this information, many CEOs in our sample seem to have been in their office well before 1992. 
Therefore, to avoid any bias due to omitted articles that characterize CEOs prior to 1992, our article 
searches start from the first date the CEO is hired.11 When using the press-based proxy of CEO 
overconfidence, we find a final sample of 1,860 firms, with 10,843 firm–year observations.12 
As Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we always use lagged 
overconfidence measures relative to the dependent variable. The use of disjoint periods to establish the 
overconfidence measure in year t - 1 and to gauge its effects on corporate diversification valuation and 
outcomes in year t is intended to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Our study reports results using both 
                                                          
11 Our access to financial articles through Factiva starts in 1980. 
12 We note that this measure allows a CEO to change from being overconfident to rational when the number of 
articles using cautious terms are greater than the number of articles using the confident terms during a certain 
year. Nevertheless, consistent with overconfidence being a permanent trait, the classification is highly persistent. 
For instance, when a CEO is classified as overconfident in period t, the CEO will remain overconfident 83% of 
the time in period t + 1 and 82.51% of the time in period t + 2. 
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measures of CEO overconfidence. For convenience, we use the variable CEO_OC, which takes the 
value of one when the CEO is overconfident and zero otherwise. In addition, we use the variable 
CEO_NOT_OC, which takes the value of one when the CEO is not overconfident (i.e. rational) and 
zero otherwise. 
 
IV. Results 
The empirical investigation is on the effect of CEO overconfidence on corporate diversification 
valuation. Therefore, this study first investigates whether diversified firms managed by overconfident 
CEOs exhibit lower valuation compared to diversified firms managed by rational CEOs. Subsequently, 
using an alternative empirical approach, the study further checks for value-destructive diversification 
investments by exploring whether the average overconfident CEO exhibits a heightened tendency to 
refocus. Finally, in the spirit of Malmendier and Tate (2008), the study also tests for the presence of a 
value-destructive channel by investigating whether overconfident CEOs show a pronounced tendency 
to carry out more diversifying decisions compared to their rational peers. This channel must be present 
in the data to fully support the value-destructive diversification investment decisions and subsequent 
heightened refocusing activity associated with overconfident CEOs. 
 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the most important variables, segregated into firm–
years where CEOs are classified as either overconfident or rational. The results suggest that 
overconfident CEOs who either increase their exposure to firm stock or are characterized as 
confident/optimistic more often than pessimistic/cautious in the press tend to manage larger firms, 
spend less for capital expenditures, and have higher sensitivity to risk. The latter observation is 
consistent with the view that overconfident CEOs are willing to accept compensation that is more 
sensitive to firm risk, since they are inclined to make riskier investments. Further, the results show no 
material relation between the past year’s stock returns and overconfidence, suggesting that neither of 
these measures relates significantly to past firm performance. Regarding the sample with the press 
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overconfidence measure, the total number of articles citing CEOs is greater for overconfident CEOs 
than for rational CEOs. Consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2008), these figures seem to suggest that 
the financial press covers more positive than negative stories. Regarding corporate policies, evidence 
suggests that overconfident CEOs exhibit a heightened tendency to making more refocusing and 
diversification decisions compared to their rational peers. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
With respect to the other variables, the relations appear to differ between the two 
overconfidence measures. Focusing on the sample with the net buyer overconfidence measure, we find 
overconfident CEOs have a lower delta and tenure and manage firms that appear to be slightly more 
financially distressed, as indicated by cash holding constraints, and firms that are less profitable and 
exhibit lower excess values. These relations are generally in the opposite direction when the sample is 
analysed with the press overconfidence measure. Such conflicting univariate relations between the two 
samples with net buyer/press measures of overconfidence could relate to the fact that the relations 
between these variables and overconfidence in panel data are unclear. For instance, given that 
overconfident CEOs perceive external financing as unduly costly (MT, Malmendier et al. (2011)), they 
should accumulate cash to finance future investment opportunities; at the same time, however, when 
they use cash to finance investments, the levels of cash will decrease. Thus, in a panel setting, the 
relation between cash-poor firms and overconfidence is unclear. Similarly, consistent with evidence on 
the bright side of overconfidence (Hirshleifer et al. (2012)), tenure should be longer for overconfident 
CEOs. In contrast, evidence indicates that excessive optimism relates to a greater probability of forced 
turnover (Campbell et al. (2011)). Similarly, these different perspectives on overconfidence can also 
confound the panel setting relation between excess value and CEO overconfidence. 
 
B. CEO Overconfidence and the Value of Corporate Diversification 
 We start our empirical investigation by examining whether diversified firms exhibit lower 
valuations after diversification, particularly when the diversification was made by an overconfident 
CEO. Similar to Campa and Kedia (2002), we select the sample of all single-segment firms and all 
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diversified firms. Diversified firms can diversify once or multiple times. We include all types of such 
firms, particularly those that diversify once from a single segment to multiple segments, those that 
diversify once from multiple segments to multiple segments, and those that diversify multiple times. In 
this analysis, we exclude diversified firms that chose to refocus during the sample period, since they 
can confound the value implications pertaining to corporate diversification and are therefore 
investigated separately in Section IV.C.13 
Campa and Kedia (2002) document that the characteristics of firms that diversify, which make 
the benefits of diversification greater than the costs of diversification, can also cause firms to be 
discounted, thus implying a self-selection mechanism behind firms’ decisions to diversify (see also 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015)). Along this line, Campa and Kedia find a strong negative 
correlation between a firm’s choice to diversify and firm value and argue that the lower valuation of 
diversified firms documented is not adequate evidence that diversification destroys value per se. 
Therefore, observing in the cross section that diversified firm–years have lower valuations compared to 
focused firm–years does not necessarily imply that diversification destroys value. Unlike prior studies 
that rely on cross-sectional data, ours instead relies on a time-series analysis that alleviates self-selection 
concerns that would otherwise have complicated the cross-sectional analysis. More specifically, the 
time-series analysis allows us to segregate firm valuations into two components: (i) the one that applies 
to the firm’s value before the decision to diversify, which would also reflect all those elements that 
could have caused lower valuations in the first place and (endogenously) forced the firm to self-select 
to diversify, and (ii) the one that applies after the firm makes the decision to diversify. Therefore, this 
econometric approach is suitable for assessing the pure impact of diversification on a firm’s value by 
comparing its valuation before and after the first incidence of diversification (Andreou et al. (2016)). 
Furthermore, a time-series approach makes our findings less likely to be biased by methodological 
problems that can arise during the estimation of excess value (e.g. Whited (2001), Campa and Kedia 
                                                          
13 Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995), and Berger and Ofek (1996) provide evidence that 
refocusing firms experience increases in valuations. To avoid such confounding impacts on the value of corporate 
diversification, we exclude all refocusing firms, particularly those that refocus once from multiple segments to a 
single segment, those that refocus once from multiple segments to multiple segments, and those that refocus 
multiple times. Moreover, we exclude multi-segment firms that do not change their number of segments.  
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(2002), Villalonga (2004a), Santalo and Becerra (2008)), since methodological or measurement 
problems should affect firm valuation similarly before and after the decision to diversify. Specifically, 
we estimate variants of the following linear regression model: 
𝐸𝑋𝐶_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐹𝑇_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is excess value (EXC_VALt), DIV is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm diversifies at any point (either before or after diversification) and zero 
otherwise, and AFT_DIV is a post-diversification dummy variable that equals one for all firm–years 
starting from the first incidence of diversification (i.e. the year of the first diversification event and 
onwards) and zero otherwise.14 Therefore, (i) the coefficient estimate of DIV represents firm valuation 
before the decision to diversify, (ii) the coefficient estimate of AFT_DIV indicates the change in firm 
valuation after the decision to diversify relative to valuation before the decision to diversify, and (iii) 
the sum of the coefficient estimates of DIV and AFT_DIV show the firm valuation after the decision to 
diversify. 
The control variables are based on the work of Berger and Ofek (1995) and include the ratios 
of capital expenditures to sales (INVESTt) and of earnings before interest and taxes to sales (PROFITt) 
and the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEt). In addition, consistent with Campa and Kedia (2002), 
we lag by up to two years firm size (SIZEt-1 and SIZEt-2), profitability (PROFITt-1 and PROFITt-2), and 
investments (INVESTt-1 and INVESTt-2). We also include the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (LEVt) 
and control for potential nonlinear effects of firm size on firm value by including firm size squared 
(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡
2). Finally, we include year fixed effects to control for unobserved year characteristics. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results using the net buyer measure of overconfidence. Model (1) 
shows that diversified firms have a valuation of -12.0% (p-value < 0.05) before their first diversification 
decision is made and a reduction in valuation of -14.1% (p-value < 0.05) due to diversification, implying 
a valuation of -26.1% (p-value < 0.01) after the first incidence of diversification. These findings are 
consistent with the self-selection reasoning of Campa and Kedia (2002) regarding the decision to 
                                                          
14 Note that this estimation does not suffer from the dummy variable trap, since the sample includes focused firms 
as well. 
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diversify, since firms that choose to diversify appear to demonstrate profoundly lower valuations before 
the first incidence of diversification. Self-selection, however, can affect overconfident and rational 
CEOs differently, because overconfidence affects CEOs’ perceptions about their firm’s valuation (i.e. 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to perceive their firm as being undervalued). Accordingly, to 
estimate the valuation effect of corporate diversification for overconfident and rational CEOs, it is 
important to interact both diversification and post-diversification dummy variables for overconfident 
CEOs and rational CEOs. These interaction terms are useful for separately segregating the changes in 
valuation due to diversification for both overconfident and rational CEOs.15 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Model (2) of Table 2 presents the results. The results suggest that, before the first decision to 
diversify, firms with diversifications undertaken by overconfident CEOs exhibit valuations of -14.1% 
(p-value < 0.05), whereas firms with diversifications by rational CEOs are not discounted at all. After 
the first decision to diversify, firms with diversifications undertaken by overconfident CEOs show a 
further drop of -21.4% (p-value < 0.05) in valuation, implying a substantial reduction in valuations 
totalling -35.5% (p-value < 0.01). Diversifications undertaken by rational CEOs also exhibit lower 
valuations totalling -17.6% (p-value < 0.05) after the decision to diversify, but the reduction value of    
-7.3% is not statistically significant. Hence, for these firms, diversification does not appear statistically 
to be value destructive. 
In model (3) of Table 2, we provide a more direct analysis of the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on diversification performance using only the sample of diversified (multi-segment) 
firms and investigate the impact of diversification using the post-diversification dummy variable. 
Consistent with the findings, as in model (1), diversified firms experience a decline in valuations of        
-9.9%, albeit it is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. In model (4), we segregate the post-
diversification valuations between overconfident and rational CEOs. Consistent with the findings in 
model (2), the results indicate that firms with diversifications undertaken by overconfident CEOs are 
                                                          
15 We avoid any confounding effects from changes in CEO overconfidence before and after the first incidence of 
diversification by keeping in our analysis only firms with either overconfident or rational CEOs for the whole 
period that each firm is in our sample. This approach is necessary so the before and after analyses can capture the 
pure effects of CEO overconfidence on corporate diversification value. 
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valued at -19.5% (p-value < 0.05). In addition, there is no valuation discount for diversified firms with 
diversifications undertaken by rational CEOs. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports estimates of the relation between excess value, diversification, and 
CEO overconfidence using the press-based measure. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar with 
the findings in Panel A, suggesting that firms that choose to diversify exhibit lower valuations after the 
first incidence of diversification. More importantly, however, it is an empirical fact that the lower 
valuations seem to be mostly driven by diversifications undertaken by overconfident CEOs. For 
instance, the results in model (2) in Panel B indicate that, after the first incidence of diversification and 
compared to diversified firms run by rational CEOs, diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs have 
valuations that are 12.5% economically lower (-27.2% vs. -14.7%) when the press measure of 
overconfidence is used instead. 
 
B.1 Robustness Checks 
We assess the sensitivity of our results using three robustness checks. First, Graham et al. 
(2002) argue that the diversification discount provides misleading inferences due to violation of the 
standard assumption that a firm’s segments can be benchmarked against typical standalone firms. The 
authors argue that the diversification discount arises not because diversification destroys value per se, 
but because firms acquire already discounted target firms. We control for the possible impact of 
discounted targets on our findings as follows: first we identify firm–years with change in assets of more 
than 50% from year t - 1 to year t. Laeven and Levine (2007) argue that such changes in assets, among 
others, could reflect large acquisitions. Then, we rerun models (2) and (4) of Table 2 after including a 
dummy variable that equals one for year t and all later years in which a firm potentially experienced 
large acquisitions and zero otherwise (POST_ACQUISITION). In additional tests, we verify that our 
findings do not change when we redefine the dummy variable to equal one for year t - 1 and all later 
years in which a firm potentially experienced large acquisitions and zero otherwise. The results are 
reported in models (1) and (3) of Table 3, respectively. Irrespective of the measure of overconfidence 
used, consistent with Graham et al. (2002), the coefficient estimate of the post-acquisition dummy 
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variable is negative, albeit only significant when excess value relative to focused firms is compared, as 
shown in model (1). Most importantly, this control does not affect our main findings. When 
diversification is carried out by overconfident CEOs, the firm still exhibits much lower valuations. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Second, Mansi and Reeb (2002) and Glaser and Mueller (2010) argue that the diversification 
discount stems from a risk-reducing effect of corporate diversification, which implies that a diversified 
firm’s market value of debt could trade at a premium relative to the book value of debt. Accordingly, 
for diversified firms, excess value estimated using the book value of debt, following Berger and Ofek 
(1995), suffers from a downward bias. To assess the sensitivity of our findings to this issue, we re-
estimate excess value using the market value of debt instead of the book value of debt. We estimate the 
market value of debt using Merton’s (1974) bond-pricing model. Following Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
and Bharath and Shumway (2008), we set the input parameters of the model as the standard deviation 
of daily stock returns over the past 125 days, the one-year Treasury constant maturity rate, the firm’s 
face value of total debt, and the firm’s market capitalization. Time to maturity is set equal to one year. 
Then, using the new estimates of excess value, we rerun models (2) and (4) of Table 2 and report the 
new results in models (2) and (4) of Table 3, respectively. The results remain virtually unchanged for 
both measures of overconfidence: diversifications made by overconfident CEOs still show significantly 
lower valuations after diversification. 
Third, it is possible that the results are affected by time-invariant firm characteristics. Including 
firm fixed effects could alleviate such concerns; however, due to the sample construction, firm fixed 
effects would be largely correlated with the CEO overconfidence status. Hence, we rely upon an 
alternative approach to control for time-invariant firm characteristics, including one- and two-year-
lagged excess values as additional controls. The idea is that important time-invariant firm characteristics 
should largely affect the valuation of the firm on a persistent basis (i.e. should be already incorporated 
in the two lagged excess values). Such a model specification could alleviate concerns about endogeneity 
arising from time-invariant firm characteristics. Using this approach, we rerun models (2) and (4) of 
Table 2 and report the results in models (3) and (6) of Table 3, respectively. Interestingly, as when using 
firm fixed effects, we find the adjusted R2 value increases substantially relative to the other models, 
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attesting that the lagged values of excess value capture a substantial portion of the heterogeneity of the 
dependent variable. Importantly, the findings on CEO overconfidence remain qualitatively similar. 
 
C. CEO Overconfidence, Past Diversification, and Corporate Refocusing 
Decisions 
In this section, we test the prediction of our theoretical model according to which the 
overconfident CEO is expected to demonstrate a heightened tendency to refocus when feedback on a 
project’s negative payoff becomes available through stock prices. For this analysis, our sample consists 
of firms that can potentially refocus and firms that refocus but still have a multi-segment structure or 
end up as single-segment firms. Specifically, we estimate variants of the following multivariate logistic 
regression model: 
𝑅𝐸𝐹_𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇_𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−3:𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
The dependent variable is corporate refocusing decision events measured in year t 
(REF_EVENTt) and all the control variables are measured in year t - 1. The main variable of interest, 
PAST_DIVt-3:t-1, is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm diversified at least once in the period 
from year t - 3 to t - 1 and zero otherwise. In additional untabulated tests, we find that our results do not 
change when measuring the presence of past diversifications in the period from year t - 5 to year t - 1. 
The control variables are as in equation (1). In addition, we control for whether the firm is cash 
constrained, using a dummy variable (CASH_POORt) that equals one when the residuals of the 
corporate cash model of Opler et al. (1999) are negative and zero otherwise.16 We also control for the 
possibility that our overconfidence measures are affected by past stock performance (Malmendier et al. 
(2011)) by using the past year’s stock returns (RETt). Further, we include one-period-lagged excess 
value (EXC_VALt-1) to control for omitted variables bias that relates to the decision to refocus (Campa 
and Kedia (2002)). Consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we also consider CEO-related controls, 
including tenure, compensation incentives, and press attention. Tenure is the natural logarithm of one 
                                                          
16 The coefficient estimates of the cash model of Opler et al. (1999) are available upon request. 
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plus the number of years the CEO has been in office (TENUREt). The compensation incentives are 
(i) vega, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the change in the risk-neutral value of the CEO’s 
portfolio of stock options for a 1% change in the standard deviation of the return of the underlying stock 
(VEGAt), and (ii) delta, defined as the natural logarithm of the change in the risk-neutral value of the 
CEO’s portfolio of stock and stock options for a 1% change in the price of the return of the underlying 
stock (DELTAt). Finally, press attention is the number of articles mentioning the CEO (MENTIONt) and 
is relevant only to model specifications that use the press-based measure of overconfidence. 
Table 4 presents the logistic regression results with firm random effects and year effects, which 
are used to control for unobserved firm and year heterogeneity, respectively. Models (1) and (3) present 
the results for the relation between corporate refocusing and past diversification decisions for the two 
measures of overconfidence employed in the analysis. The coefficient for past diversifications in model 
(1) is equal to 0.511 (p-value < 0.05), suggesting that past diversification activity significantly increases 
the likelihood of refocusing. The corresponding odds ratio of firms with past diversification pursuing 
refocusing is 1.67 times the odds ratio of the remaining CEOs. A similar result is obtained when the 
press-related measure of overconfidence is used, since the coefficient in model (3) is 0.49 (p-value < 
0.01) and the corresponding odds ratio is 1.63. Overall, consistent with prior refocusing literature, these 
results suggest that past diversification is a significant determinant of corporate refocusing decisions. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Models (2) and (4) in Table 4 report the results for past diversification(s) undertaken by 
overconfident CEOs and rational CEOs, respectively. Specifically, we define a dummy variable 
(PAST_DIV_CEO_OC) as equal to one if a firm diversified in the period from year t - 3 to year t - 1 
and at least one diversification event was undertaken by an overconfident CEO and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, we define a dummy variable (PAST_DIV_CEO_NOT_OC) that takes the value of one when 
a firm diversified in the period from year t - 3 to year t - 1 and all prior diversification events were 
undertaken by a rational CEO and zero otherwise. Interestingly, the results suggest that past 
diversifications relate to refocusing only when they were undertaken by overconfident CEOs. The 
coefficients (odds ratios) in models (2) and (4) for prior diversification by overconfident CEOs pursuing 
at least one diversification decision are 0.721 (2.056) and 0.863 (2.370), respectively (Aoth p-values < 
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0.01). In contrast, there is only weak evidence of corporate refocusing for past diversification decisions 
made by rational CEOs and only when the press-related measure is used. This relation, as shown in 
model (4), is marginally significant at the 10% level.17 By comparing models (2) and (4), the coefficient 
values of past diversifications made by overconfident CEOs against those of past diversification made 
by rational CEOs, we infer that the odds of corporate refocusing decisions are 67% to 98% higher when 
past diversifications were made by overconfident CEOs rather than rational CEOs. This empirical 
finding lends credence to the model presented in this study, which predicts heightened corporate 
refocusing activity by overconfident CEOs who pursued diversified investments in the past once 
realized returns fail to match initial expectations. 
Among the control variables, the results show that firms with high levels of capital expenditures 
in current operations exhibit a greater likelihood of refocusing, suggesting that overinvestment is 
associated with sizeable past capital expenditures. In addition, firm size leads to more refocusing, 
whereas firms with greater profitability (using the net buyer sample) and higher past performance are 
less likely to refocus. The latter result suggests that refocusing could be a response to market pressure. 
Vega predicts more refocusing (with the net buyer sample) because, for CEOs with high vega exposure, 
the refocusing most probably has a great positive impact on stock option compensation. On the contrary, 
delta predicts less refocusing, since refocusing increases the idiosyncratic risk that CEOs usually try to 
avoid by pursuing self-interested diversification. Tenure is negatively related to refocusing, consistent 
with the view that it exacerbates agency problems. Finally, when using the press-related sample, we 
find only weak evidence to suggest that firms with high past valuations are less likely to refocus. In 
addition, firms with greater press coverage are less likely to refocus. 
                                                          
17 Corporate refocusing events can be decomposed into two categories: (i) divestments of segments added in the 
past as a result of a diversification strategy, which are likely to mirror a failed diversification policy; and 
(ii) broader restructuring, that is, the divestment of other segments unrelated to past diversification actions. 
Accordingly, we also examine the relation between past diversifications by overconfident CEOs and past 
diversifications by rational CEOs with each type of corporate refocusing event. Untabulated analysis results reveal 
that, compared to past diversifications by rational CEOs, past diversifications by overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to lead to divestment of the same segment (significant at the 10% level when the press-related measure is 
used). Additionally, compared to past diversifications by rational CEOs, past diversifications by overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to lead to divestment of other segments (significant at the 5% level when the net buyer 
measure is used).  
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In summary, strong evidence suggests that corporate refocusing decisions mainly relate to 
diversification decisions undertaken in the past by overconfident CEOs. 
 
C.1 Additional results 
Aktas et al. (2013) document that learning in a merger and acquisition setting is more important 
when there is CEO continuity from deal to deal. Based on this perspective, our findings should remain 
robust when ensuring that the CEO who made past unsuccessful diversified investments is the same 
CEO who makes the corporate refocusing decision. We test this perspective by re-estimating models 
(2) and (4) as in Table 4 after (i) including a dummy variable that equals one when there is a change in 
a firm’s CEO in the year that is contemporaneous with corporate refocusing, as illustrated in models (1) 
and (3) of Table 5 (including this dummy variable alleviates concerns over potential corrective actions 
arising from newly hired CEOs and reinforces our inferences about learning for CEOs who likely 
continue in office) and (ii) requiring the CEOs to remain on board during the three years leading to 
refocusing, as illustrated in models (2) and (4) of Table 5. Overall, as shown in Table 5, corporate 
refocusing decisions continue to strongly relate to diversification decisions undertaken in the past by 
overconfident CEOs. Hence, consistent with the inferences of Aktas et al. (2013), the results of Table 
5 imply that learning by the same CEO is a plausible explanation of our findings. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
D. CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Diversification Decisions 
Our empirical evidence so far demonstrates that diversified firms managed by overconfident 
CEOs experience substantial shareholder value loss. As discussed, we hypothesize that this happens 
because of the excessive tendency of overconfident CEOs to make more failed diversification decisions 
than their rational peers, especially when they are not faced with financial constraints. In light of this 
reasoning, we test this value destruction channel according to which overconfident CEOs are expected 
to undertake more diversifying decisions, compared to their rational peers. The seeds of this notion have 
been advanced by Roll (1986) and validated in the laboratory by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). 
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We begin the analysis by plotting in Figure 1 the unconditional relation between overconfident 
CEOs and corporate diversification decisions over time. Based on the net buyer measure, the fraction 
of overconfident CEOs involved in corporate diversification decisions is higher in most of the years in 
the sample (10 out of the 17 years). Aggregating over time, we find the odds ratio of an overconfident 
CEO with at least one diversification decision is 1.30 that of rational CEOs (p-value < 0.01). Using the 
press-related measure, we find that, in 13 out of 17 years in the sample, overconfident CEOs make more 
diversification decisions. Throughout the sample period, the odds ratio of overconfident CEOs with at 
least one diversification decision is 1.33 times the odds ratio of the rational CEOs (p-value < 0.01). 
Overall, these findings suggest that CEO overconfidence is associated with a higher probability of 
diversification events and could be a significant determinant in the decision to make a corporate 
diversification investment. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We then validate the robustness of the unconditional patterns in Figure 1 using variants of the 
following multivariate logistic regression model: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (3) 
where the dependent variable, corporate diversification decision events (DIV_EVENTt), is a dummy 
variable that equals one when the number of segments reported increases relative to the previous year 
and zero otherwise and CASH_POORi,t-1 is dummy variable that equals one when the residuals of the 
corporate cash model of Opler et al. (1999) are negative and zero otherwise. Control variables are as in 
equation (2). In addition, we include firm random effects and year effects to control for unobserved firm 
and year heterogeneity, respectively. 
Table 6 reports the results. Specifically, models (1) and (3) of Table 6 suggest that 
overconfident CEOs are generally more likely to diversify, since the coefficient for the net buyer 
measure is 0.369 (p-value < 0.05) and that for the press measure is 0.512 (p-value < 0.01). The 
corresponding odds ratios for overconfident CEOs pursuing at least one diversification equals 1.45 
times that for the net buyer measure and 1.67 times that for the press measure relative to the odds ratio 
of the remaining CEOs. 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
We then investigate whether overconfident CEOs of cash-rich firms are more likely to 
diversify. To perform this analysis, we segregate the impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate 
diversification into the impact observed in cash-rich firms and the impact observed in cash-poor firms, 
as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 X 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 X 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (4) 
where CASH_RICHi,t-1 is a dummy variable that equals one when the residuals of the corporate cash 
model of Opler et al. (1999) are positive and zero otherwise. The results in models (2) and (4) of Table 
6 suggest that overconfident CEOs of cash-rich firms are more likely to diversify, since the coefficient 
of the interaction of the net buyer measure for cash-rich firms is 0.541 (p-value < 0.01) and that for the 
press measure is 0.584 (p-value < 0.01). The corresponding odds ratios of overconfident CEOs in cash-
rich firms pursuing at least one diversification equals 1.72 for the net buyer measure and 1.79 for the 
press measure, relative to the odds ratio of rational CEOs. In contrast, there is no evidence to support a 
significant relation between CEO overconfidence and diversification decisions in cash-poor firms.18 
Among the control variables, the results show that firms with high levels of capital expenditures 
in current operations exhibit a lower likelihood of further diversification. Similarly, firms with greater 
valuation as captured by excess value are less likely to diversify. Finally, when using net buyer sample, 
we find that firms with high profitability are less likely to seek more diversification. In addition, firm 
size generally leads to greater diversification. 
In summary, the results suggest that overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest outside 
the firm’s core business, especially when there are sufficient internal funds to finance such growth. 
 
                                                          
18 The relation is marginally positive only when using the press measure with an odds ratio of overconfident CEOs 
pursuing at least one diversification that equals 1.52 times the odds ratio of rational CEOs (p-value < 0.10). This 
finding does not contradict those of previous empirical studies regarding the thesis that the investments of 
overconfident CEOs are significantly more responsive to cash flow when internal funds are abundant (Malmendier 
and Tate (2005)). This is because an overconfident CEO’s decision to diversify depends on the unobserved relation 
between overestimated expected returns of diversified investments and expected financing costs, which is affected 
by CEOs’ perceptions of their own firm’s undervaluation. Accordingly, it is unclear whether CEO overconfidence 
will have a significant impact on the likelihood to diversify in cash-poor firms. 
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D.1 Robustness Checks 
Since the heighten tendency of overconfident CEOs to make diversifying decisions is 
significantly linked with shareholder value loss, as exhibited in Table 2, we conduct a battery of 
sensitivity tests to check the robustness of this relation. First, during 1998, there was a spike in corporate 
diversification activity. This observation could partly represent noise, since segment information from 
January 1998 conforms to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131, which superseded 
SFAS 14. In particular, SFAS 14 had been criticized for inconsistent segment definitions and segment 
underreporting (Villalonga (2004a)). SFAS 131 partially addresses these caveats. Berger and Hann 
(2003) provide evidence that, following the implementation of SFAS 131, certain firms have reported 
greater numbers of segments, consistent with the pattern in our sample. Accordingly, some of our 
corporate diversification transactions during 1998 could be spurious. To investigate the sensitivity of 
our results to this issue, we exclude the year 1998 from the analysis and re-estimate the unconditional 
relation in Figure 1 between overconfident CEOs and corporate diversification events. Untabulated 
univariate results show that the odds ratio of overconfident CEOs with at least one diversification event 
is 1.23 (1.42) times the odds ratio of rational CEOs when the net buyer measure (press measure) is used 
(Aoth significant at the 1% level). We also re-estimate the multivariate logistic regressions that control 
for firm- and CEO-related characteristics and find, as shown in models (1) and (4) of Table 7, that CEO 
overconfidence still predicts a pronounced tendency towards diversification decisions. Overall, the 
strong relation between CEO overconfidence and diversification decisions does not depend on the 
implementation of SFAS 131. Rather, these findings provide additional support suggesting that CEO 
overconfidence is a significant and invariant determinant of corporate diversification activity.19 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Second, we investigate whether our findings are robust, using a sample of focused firms and 
focused firms that diversify. Campa and Kedia (2002) find that the characteristics of single-segment 
firms are substantially differ from those of multi-segment firms. Accordingly, by concentrating on 
                                                          
19 Supplementary to this analysis, we also re-estimate models (1) and (4) of Table 6 using information from the 
period either before or after 1998. Untabulated results for both periods are qualitatively similar to those reported 
in the study. 
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focused firms and focused firms that diversify, we ensure a more homogeneous sample that alleviates 
concerns over potential omitted variable biases. The results in models (2) and (5) of Table 7 show that 
sample homogeneity does not affect our main findings. 
Third, assuming that business segment reporting corresponds to distinct internal business units, 
as suggested by Rajan et al. (2000), an ordinal regression approach could allow us to better capture the 
diversified firm scope variation within, relative to the logit approach. Therefore, we also employ ordinal 
regression analysis using the firm’s number of business segments as the dependent variable 
(NUM_SEGMt). However, inferences from this approach could be complicated by endogeneity 
concerns between corporate diversification and CEO overconfidence. For instance, if the boards of 
diversified firms hire overconfident CEOs more often than rational CEOs, then a relation between 
corporate diversification and CEO overconfidence could be an artifact of the hiring procedures.20 To 
alleviate potential endogeneity concerns, we control for the number of segments during the year the 
CEO is hired. Such an estimation model becomes a first-difference model of the current number of 
segments, which is the dependent variable, relative to the number of segments during the year of CEO 
hiring, which is the independent variable (albeit, the first-difference model where the coefficient 
estimate of the number of segments during the year of CEO hiring is not constrained to one). The results 
in models (3) and (6) of Table 7 show that our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Finally, we also examine the sensitivity of the findings to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. To 
perform this test, each firm must have conducted at least one diversification, belong to either the 
subsample of cash-rich or cash-poor firm–years, and have at least one overconfident and one rational 
CEO. This requirement considerably reduces the number of observations (Aetween 107 and 448 firm–
year observations, depending on the measure of overconfidence and the subsamples of cash-rich and 
cash-poor firm–years), rendering the results from such an analysis less reliable. To alleviate this 
problem, we perform a less strict analysis by running regressions in the spirit of models (1) and (3) of 
Table 6 after controlling for firm fixed effects. Based on this analysis, we cannot provide inferences 
                                                          
20 Gervais et al. (2011) argue that, among others, firms can hire overconfident CEOs due to the lower cost of 
motivating them to undertake riskier projects. In addition, overconfidence commits CEOs to exert effort to learn 
about projects. 
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regarding the interaction effect of CEO overconfidence and internal cash availability on corporate 
diversification. However, the advantage of this test is that we have a larger number of firm–year 
observations (503 and 999 for the net buyer– and press-based measures of overconfidence, 
respectively). Most importantly, however, this investigation utilizes within-firm and within-CEO 
variation, which is useful to control for time-invariant firm effects on corporate diversification. 
Untabulated results consistent with the findings in Table 6 reveal that the odds ratio of overconfident 
CEOs pursuing at least one diversification equals 2.464 (3.257) times the odds ratio of rational CEOs 
(significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively). These results provide supplemental support for the 
view that CEO overconfidence leads to more corporate diversification decisions. 
 
E. Alternative Explanations 
In this section, we consider alternative explanations for the link between our CEO 
overconfidence measures, the value of corporate diversification, and refocusing and diversification 
activity. 
Inside information: In the presence of valuable inside information, CEOs can increase 
exposure to their firm’s risk before market participants have access to such information. If inside 
information includes growth opportunities that take the form of corporate diversification, then the stock 
buyer proxy of overconfidence could be linked to diversification decisions. In addition, inside 
information implies that the firm stock is undervalued and decisions to diversify should therefore be 
sensitive to the availability of internal funds (Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
An inside information explanation, however, should be short-lived whereas our stock buyer 
proxy is habitual. In addition, an inside information explanation suggests that stock buyers should make 
better diversification decisions. Instead, our evidence shows the opposite, that stock buyers seem to 
destroy value through corporate diversification. Finally, the press-based proxy of overconfidence 
utilizes press information and should not capture inside information. 
Risk tolerance: Risk-tolerant CEOs can increase their exposure to firm risk by buying stocks. 
Similarly, some words in the press-based proxy can also indicate willingness to accept more risk. Such 
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CEOs could be inclined to undertake more challenging projects that are more difficult to manage, such 
as corporate diversification investments. 
Although greater risk tolerance can induce stock buying, this does not imply that such behaviour 
is habitual. Most importantly, greater risk tolerance should relate to a lower sensitivity of diversification 
to internal funds, since more risk-tolerant CEOs could exploit external financing for investment 
purposes. Our evidence about CEOs’ appetite for diversification, especially when a firm has abundant 
internal funds, is inconsistent with such an explanation. Finally, a risk tolerance explanation cannot be 
reconciled with our findings on corporate diversification performance. 
Board pressure: The board can coerce CEOs to buy additional firm stocks to signal to the 
market the quality of corporate diversification. If the signal is correct, we would expect the 
diversification to create value. Instead, we find that corporate refocusing relates to past diversifications 
and that firms that do not refocus exhibit a diversification discount after they diversify. We also find 
that these effects are stronger when the diversification is undertaken by stock-buying CEOs. 
 If the signal is wrong, perhaps due to incorrect beliefs of the board, we would expect a reversal 
of the corporate diversification, that is, refocusing. While such an explanation is supported by our 
findings on corporate refocusing, we still find that a portion of firms that do not refocus exhibit a 
diversification discount. In addition, this explanation is difficult to reconcile with our press-based proxy 
of overconfidence. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Empirical evidence in the 1990s and 2000s has led to active debate among researchers about 
the valuation effects of corporate diversification. In addition, theoretical and empirical evidence in the 
last decade has exemplified the impact of managerial overconfidence, one of the most prominent 
cognitive biases of corporate managers, on firm policies and organizational outcomes. In this study, we 
present a theoretical model that links CEO overconfidence to the value loss of corporate diversification 
and the adoption of post-diversification refocusing strategies. This model expands on the theoretical 
framework of MT by considering corporate diversification investments undertaken by CEOs with risk 
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preferences who are capable of dynamically adjusting their policies by reversing (or not) failed 
diversified decisions they made in the past. Consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, 
following the first incidence of diversification, our findings show that the valuations of diversified firms 
run by overconfident CEOs are significantly lower, by 12.5% to 14.1%, compared to their counterparts 
run by rational CEOs. This study further postulates that managerial overconfidence offers a compelling 
explanation for why CEOs pursue, in the first place, such value-destructive corporate diversification 
strategies followed by corrective actions through refocusing and finds evidence in support of this 
prediction. Specifically, our results show that the odds of corporate refocusing decisions are 67% to 
98% higher when past diversification decisions were made by overconfident CEOs. 
Overall, our findings identify the adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence on firm value. 
In that respect, CEO overconfidence provides a prominent alternative explanation to traditional theories 
that link diversification and firm value to agency problems. Consequently, our findings have 
implications for contracting practices and organizational design. More refined corporate governance 
structures that constrain the use of internal funds could be necessary to deter the adverse valuation 
effects of CEO overconfidence pertaining to distorted investment decisions. In addition, either the board 
of directors and/or institutional owners may need to be more active to restrain managerial 
overconfidence.  
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Appendix A: Theoretical Foundations 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
Rearrange constraint (2) to solve for the number of new shares: 
 𝑠′ = 𝑠
𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑁𝐼 − 𝐹(𝑁)
  
Substitute the above into equation (1), and after some algebra the objective of the CEO becomes:     
 
max
{𝐼,𝑠′,𝑐,𝑑,𝑁}
{𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
− (𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑)
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
} 
 
Subject to constraints:  
 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶, 𝑑 ≤ 𝐷, 𝑐 + 𝑑 ≤ 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) (A1) 
 𝑐 ≥ 0, 𝑑 ≥ 0, 𝑁 ≥ 0 (A2) 
Define the Lagrange multipliers for 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶, 𝑑 ≤ 𝐷, 𝑐 + 𝑑 ≤ 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) as 𝜆, 𝜇, 𝑣 respectively, then the 
first order conditions to the above optimization problem after some algebra are: 
 
𝑁𝑅′(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑁
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
− (𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑)
Δ𝑁𝑅′(𝐼)(𝐴 + 𝐶 − 𝑐 − 𝑑)
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]2
+𝑁𝑣 = 0 
(A3) 
 
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
−
Δ𝑁𝑅(𝐼)[𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]2
− 1 − 𝜆 − 𝑣 = 0 (A4) 
 
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
−
Δ𝑁𝑅(𝐼)[𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]2
− 1 − 𝜇 − 𝑣 = 0 (A5) 
 
 
𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − (𝐼 + 𝐹′(𝑁))
𝐴 + 𝐶 +𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
− (𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑)
Δ𝑅(𝐼)(𝐴 + 𝐶 − 𝑐 − 𝑑)
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]2
+ (𝐼 + 𝐹′(𝑁))
= 0 
(A6) 
Part a: Set ∆= 0 and the first order conditions (FOCs), equations (A3) to (A6) become: 
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 𝑁𝑅′(𝐼) − 𝑁 + 𝑣 = 0 (A7) 
 −𝜆 − 𝑣 = 0 (A8) 
 −𝜇 − 𝑣 = 0 (A9) 
 𝑅(𝐼) − 𝐼 − 𝐹′(𝑁) = 0 (A10) 
From (A8) and (A9) 𝜆 = 𝜇 = 𝑣 = 0 implying that none of the constraints in (A1) binds. Therefore, 
(A7) entails that 𝑅′(𝐼∗) = 1 and thus from definition 1 𝐼∗ = 𝐼𝐹𝐵. Also (A10) implies 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝐼𝐹𝐵 −
𝐹′(𝑁∗) = 0 which by using definition (1) reduces to 𝑁∗ = 𝑁𝐹𝐵. 
Part b: Suppose that ∆> 0 and 𝑣 = 0, then from (A4) and (A5) 
 𝜆 = 𝜇 =
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
−
Δ𝑁𝑅(𝐼)[𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]
[𝐴 + 𝐶 +𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]2
− 1  
After a little bit of algebra:  
 𝜆 = 𝜇 =
Δ𝑁𝑅(𝐼)[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑁𝐼 − 𝐹(𝑁)]
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]2
> 0 
 
 
This implies that the first 2 constraints in (A1) are binding and thus 𝑐 = 𝐶 and 𝑑 = 𝐷. After some 
algebra the first FOC, equation (A3), becomes:    
 
𝑅′(𝐼) =
1
1 + Δ
𝐴 + 𝐶 − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑁𝐼 − 𝐹(𝑁)
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
 
 
 
The above can take the following form after substituting in 𝑐 = 𝐶 and 𝑑 = 𝐷: 
 𝑅′(𝐼) =
1
1 + ΔΦ
 (A11) 
Where 
 Φ ≡
𝐴 − 𝐷
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝐷
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑁𝐼 − 𝐹(𝑁)
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) + 𝐷
 (A12) 
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By definition 𝐴 > 𝐷 and 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) > 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁). Since Φ > 0 and 𝑅(. ) is concave, the level of 
investment that satisfies (A11) is 𝐼∗ = 𝐼̅ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 as definition 3 states. 
To determine the optimal number of sectors, combine the last FOC, equation (A6), along with 𝑐 = 𝐶 
and 𝑑 = 𝐷 and 𝑣 = 0  and after some algebra it takes the following form: 
 𝐹′(𝑁) = 𝑅(𝑁)(1 + ΔΦ) − 𝐼  
By definition (3) the above has a solution 𝑁∗ = ?̅? 
 𝐹′(?̅?) = 𝑅(𝐼)̅(1 + ΔΦ) − 𝐼 ̅ (A13) 
By assumption 𝐹(. ) is convex thus to check whether ?̅? > 𝑁𝐹𝐵 we need to compare 𝐹′(?̅?) from the 
above equation with the solution to the first-best which is repeated below: 
 𝐹′(𝑁𝐹𝐵) = 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝐼𝐹𝐵  
We need to show that 𝐹′(?̅?) > 𝐹′(𝑁𝐹𝐵). However, on the first hand 𝑅(𝐼)̅(1 + ΔΦ) > 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) but on 
the other hand 𝐼 ̅ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 therefore it is not trivial which one is larger.  
Define the quantity of interest as: 
 Ψ ≡ 𝐹′(𝑁) − 𝐹′(𝑁𝐹𝐵) = 𝑅(𝐼)̅(1 + ΔΦ) − 𝐼 ̅ − [𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝐼𝐹𝐵]  
Use equation (A11) in the above and get: 
 Ψ =
𝑅(𝐼)̅
𝑅′(𝐼)̅
− (𝐼 ̅ − 𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) =
1
𝑅′(𝐼)̅
[𝑅(𝐼)̅ − 𝑅′(𝐼)̅(𝐼 ̅ − 𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅′(𝐼)̅𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵)]  
Add and subtract 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) in the above equation, which becomes 
 Ψ =
1
𝑅′(𝐼)̅
[𝑅(𝐼)̅ − 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅′(𝐼)̅(𝐼 ̅ − 𝐼𝐹𝐵) + 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵)(1 − 𝑅′(𝐼)̅)]  
For the last term in the brackets of the above equation, as long as 𝐼 ̅ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and 𝑅(. ) is concave, then 
𝑅′(𝐼) < 1 and the last term 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵)(1 − 𝑅′(𝐼)̅) > 0 is positive.  It only remains to prove that 𝑅(𝐼)̅ −
𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅′(𝐼)̅(𝐼 ̅ − 𝐼𝐹𝐵) ≥ 0. 
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(The proof is an application of the Rooftop Theorem). From the concavity of 𝑅(. ) we know that for 
every 𝑡 ∈ [0,1] 
 𝑅((1 − 𝑡)𝐼 ̅ + 𝑡𝐼𝐹𝐵) ≥ (1 − 𝑡)𝑅(𝐼)̅ + 𝑡𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵)  
Gather all 𝑡 together and rearrange  
 𝑅(𝐼 ̅ + 𝑡(𝐼𝐹𝐵 − 𝐼)̅) − 𝑅(𝐼)̅ ≥ 𝑡(𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅(𝐼)̅)  
Divide both sides by 𝑡 and take the limit 
 lim
𝑡→0
𝑅(𝐼 ̅ + 𝑡(𝐼𝐹𝐵 − 𝐼)̅) − 𝑅(𝐼)̅
𝑡
≥ (𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅(𝐼)̅)  
To determine the limit use L'Hôpital's rule to get 
 𝑅′(𝐼)̅(𝐼𝐹𝐵 − 𝐼)̅ ≥ (𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅(𝐼)̅)  
Rearrange and find what we are after. That is 
 𝑅(𝐼)̅ − 𝑅(𝐼𝐹𝐵) − 𝑅′(𝐼)̅(𝐼 ̅ − 𝐼𝐹𝐵) ≥ 0  
This implies that Ψ > 0 as both the terms that we have separated are positive and thus guarantees that 
𝐹′(?̅?) > 𝐹′(𝑁𝐹𝐵) and given that 𝐹(. ) is convex ?̅? > 𝑁𝐹𝐵.  
Case b2: 𝑣 > 0 (thus 𝑐 + 𝑑 = 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁)). Define the following: 
 𝑋 ≡
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑
 (A14) 
Using all the above, the first order conditions (A3-A6) are transformed respectively as follows: 
 𝑅′(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑋 + 𝑣 = 0 (A15) 
 𝑋 − 1 − 𝜆 − 𝑣 = 0 (A16) 
 𝑋 − 1 − 𝜇 − 𝑣 = 0 (A17) 
 𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − (𝐼 + 𝐹′(𝑁))𝑋 + (𝐼 + 𝐹′(𝑁))𝑣 = 0 (A18) 
Case b2.1: Set 𝜆 = 𝜇 = 𝜈 = 0, which implies 𝑋 = 1 from (A16). Thus (A15) becomes 
 𝑅′(𝐼)(1 + Δ) = 1 (A19) 
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By definition (2) the solution to (A19) is 𝐼∗ = 𝐼 > 𝐼𝐹𝐵, where the last inequality holds since 𝑅(. ) is 
concave. From 𝜆 = 𝜇 = 0, (A16) and (A19) and definition 2 
 𝐹′(?̂?) = 𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝐼 (A20) 
We have already proved that the solution for 𝑁 when 𝐹′(𝑁) = 𝑅(𝐼)(1 + ΔΦ) − 𝐼 for all 𝐼 > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and 
for all Φ > 0 is 𝑁
∗ > 𝑁𝐹𝐵. Since 𝐼 > 𝐼𝐹𝐵, and Φ = 1 then the solution to (A20) implies also that ?̂? >
𝑁𝐹𝐵. 
Case b2.2: Suppose 𝜆 = 𝜇 > 0. This implies that 𝑐 = 𝐶 and 𝑑 = 𝐷 and therefore (A15) and (A16) 
entail  
 𝑅′(𝐼)(1 + Δ) = 1 + 𝜆 (A21) 
Similarly (A18) becomes 
 𝐹′(𝑁) = 𝑅(𝐼)
1 + Δ
1 + 𝜆
− 𝐼 (A22) 
We need to show that 𝜆 < 𝛥 for (A21) and (A22) to guarantee that 𝐼∗ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and 𝑁
∗ > 𝑁𝐹𝐵.  
Use equation (A14) along with equation (A16) and set also 𝑐 = 𝐶 and 𝑑 = 𝐷 to get 
 
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝐷
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝐷
− 1 − 𝜆 = 𝑣 > 0  
Suggesting that  
 1 + 𝜆 <
𝐴 +𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝐷
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝐷
  
Expand the brackets on the right-hand side and get 
 1 + 𝜆 < 1 + Δ
𝑁𝑅(𝐼)
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝐷
< 1 + Δ  
As 𝐴 − 𝐷 > 0 then 𝜆 < 𝛥 which proves that  𝐼∗ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and 𝑁
∗ > 𝑁𝐹𝐵.∎ 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Since 𝐶 + 𝐷 ≤ 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) equation (A12) suggests that 0 < Φ < 1. We have already shown that the 
solutions of equations (A11) and (A13) are 𝐼 > 𝐼𝐹𝐵 , N̂ > NFB for Φ = 1 and I̅ > IFB, ?̅? > 𝑁𝐹𝐵, for  
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0 < Φ < 1. The functions 𝑅(. ) and 𝐹(. ) are concave and convex respectively and as shown in the 
previous proof, as Φ approaches zero, 𝐼 ̅approaches 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and ?̅? approaches 𝑁𝐹𝐵 which implies that  
Î > I̅ > IFB and N̂ > N̅ > NFB. ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
Part a: It is trivial since the system of equations (A7) – (A10) defines the first best level of 
investment and diversification and clearly 𝐶 is absent from the system. 
Part b.1: If 𝐶 + 𝐷 ≥ 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) then the investment cost is covered through internal finance thus 
𝑣 ≥ 0 which implies that the solution is characterized by the system (A19) and (A20) when 𝜆 = 𝜇 =
0, which is also independent of 𝐶. If 𝜆 = 𝜇 > 0 then 𝑐 = 𝐶 and 𝑑 = 𝐷 and the solution is generated 
from the system (A21) and (A22), (A16), (A14). The only equation that involves 𝐶 is (A14), 
however, as 𝑐 = 𝐶, all 𝐶 disappear from the equation thus this system is also independent of initial 
cash flows 𝐶.  
Part b.2: If 𝐶 + 𝐷 < ?̂?𝐼 + 𝐹(?̂?) then the solution is characterized by (A11), (A13) and (A12) that I 
repeat below in the same order: 
 𝑅′(𝐼)(1 + ΔΦ) = 1 (A23) 
 𝑅(𝐼)(1 + ΔΦ) = 𝐼 + 𝐹′(𝑁)  (A24) 
 Φ = Φ(𝑁, 𝐼, 𝐶) (A25) 
Differentiate (A23) with respect to 𝐶 considering that both 𝐼 and 𝑁 are functions of 𝐶 at the optimum: 
 𝑅′′(𝐼)(1 + ΔΦ)
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
+ Δ𝑅′(𝐼) (
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶
+
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
+
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐶
) (A26) 
Differentiate (A24) with respect to 𝐶 considering that both 𝐼 and 𝑁 are functions of 𝐶 at the optimum: 
 𝑅′(𝐼)(1 + ΔΦ)
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
+ Δ𝑅(𝐼) (
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶
+
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
+
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐶
) =
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
+ 𝐹′′(𝑁)
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶
 (A27) 
Define: 𝐷Φ ≡
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶
+
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
+
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐶
 and use (A23) on both (A26) and (A27) to transform this system 
to:  
 
 
{
 
 
𝑅′′(𝐼)
𝑅′(𝐼)
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
= −Δ𝑅′(𝐼)𝐷Φ
Δ𝑅(𝐼)𝐷Φ = 𝐹′′(𝑁)
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶 }
 
 
 (A28) 
Define also: Φ1 ≡
𝐴−𝐷
𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1+Δ)−𝐷
 and Φ2 ≡
𝐴+𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝑁𝐼−𝐹(𝑁)
𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)+𝐷
 , which means that from (A12) 
 Φ = Φ1Φ2 (A29) 
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Differentiate (A29) with respect to 𝐼 and define the following objects to reduce the length of the 
algebraic expression as follows: 
 
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
=
𝜕Φ1
𝜕𝐼
Φ2 +Φ1
𝜕Φ2
𝜕𝐼
= Ω1 + Ω2 (A30) 
Where Ω1 =
−(𝐴−𝐷)𝑁𝑅′(𝐼)(1+Δ)
[𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1+Δ)−𝐷]2
Φ2 and Ω1 = Φ1
𝑁(𝑅′(𝐼)−1)(𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝐷)−𝑁𝑅′(𝐼)(𝐴+𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝑁𝐼−𝐹(𝑁))
[𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝐷]2
 
Use in the above the definitions of Φ1, Φ2along with (A30) and (A23) to get: 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
= Ω1 + Ω2 = −
2𝑁𝑅′(𝐼)(1 + Δ)Φ
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝐷
< 0 (A31) 
Where the last inequality appears because all terms are positive and 𝐴 − 𝐷 is also positive. 
Similarly differentiate (A29) with respect to 𝑁 which by the chain rule is: 
 
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
=
𝜕Φ1
𝜕𝑁
Φ2 +Φ1
𝜕Φ2
𝜕𝑁
= Λ1 + Λ2  
Where: Λ1 ≡
−(𝐴−𝐷)𝑅(𝐼)(1+Δ)
[𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1+Δ)−𝐷]2
Φ2 and Λ2 = Φ1
(𝑅(𝐼)−𝐼−𝐹′(𝐼))(𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝐷)−𝑅(𝐼)(𝐴+𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝑁𝐼−𝐹(𝑁))
[𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝐷]2
    
Use in the above the definitions of Φ1 and Φ2 along with (A29) and (A24) to get: 
 
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
= Λ1 + Λ2 = −
2𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ)Φ
𝐴 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝐷
 (A32) 
Now differentiate (A30) with respect to 𝐶 
 
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐶
= (
𝐴 − 𝐷
𝐴 +𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝐷
)(
1
𝐴 +𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝐷
) > 0 (A33) 
Put the system (A28) in matrix form: 
 
 
[
 
 
 
𝑅′′(𝐼)
𝑅′(𝐼)
+ Δ𝑅′(𝐼)
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
Δ𝑅′(𝐼)
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
Δ𝑅(𝐼) Δ𝑅(𝐼)
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
− 𝐹′′(𝑁)]
 
 
 
[
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶
] = −Δ [
𝑅′(𝐼)
𝑅(𝐼)
]
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐶
  
 
The solution of the system depends on the inverse of the first matrix on the left-hand side, call it 𝑀, 
that is 
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 [
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶
] = −
Δ
|𝑀|
[
 
 
 Δ𝑅(𝐼)
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
− 𝐹′′(𝑁) −
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
Δ𝑅′(𝐼)
−
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
Δ𝑅(𝐼)
𝑅′′(𝐼)
𝑅′(𝐼)
+ Δ𝑅′(𝐼)
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼 ]
 
 
 
[
𝑅′(𝐼)
𝑅(𝐼)
]
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐶
  
After the matrix multiplication the solution reduces to: 
 [
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐶
] =
Δ
|𝑀|
[
𝑅′(𝐼)𝐹′′(𝑁)
−
𝑅′′(𝐼)
𝑅′(𝐼)
𝑅(𝐼)
]
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐶
  
Apart from the determinant of 𝑀, everything else is positive since 𝑅′′(𝐼) < 0. The only thing left to 
prove is that the determinant is also positive which is true since: 
 |𝑀| = (Δ𝑅(𝐼)
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
− 𝐹′′(𝑁))
𝑅′′(𝐼)
𝑅′(𝐼)
− 𝐹′′(𝑁)Δ𝑅′(𝐼)
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
> 0  
Which is positive because as we have already shown in (A32) 
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝑁
< 0, in (A37) 
𝜕Φ
𝜕𝐼
< 0, in (A32) and 
by assumption 𝐹′′(𝑁) > 0, 𝑅′′(𝐼) and 𝑅′(𝐼) > 0 which proves that 0
dC
dI
and 0
dC
dN
.∎ 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Solve the same optimization problem as in (1)-(4), changing the objective function to 
𝑠
𝑠+𝑠′
[𝐴(1 + Δ𝐴) + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑]. Follow the exact same steps as in Proposition 1 to 
derive the following two equations that determine 𝐼 and 𝑁: 
 𝑅′(𝐼) =
1
1 + Υ
 (A34) 
 𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Υ) = 𝐼 + 𝐹′(𝑁) (A35) 
Where Υ ≡
−Δ𝐷−𝐴(Δ𝐴−Δ)
𝐴(1+Δ𝐴)+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1+Δ)−𝐷
𝐴+𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝑁𝐼−𝐹(𝑁)
𝐴+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝐷
             
When Δ𝐴 > Δ then Υ < 0 , and using the same logic as in Proposition 1, (A34) implies that the 
optimal investment is 𝐼∗ < 𝐼𝐹𝐵 and diversification 𝑁
∗ < 𝑁𝐹𝐵.  When Δ >
𝐴Δ𝐴
𝐴−𝐷
 then Υ > 0 and the 
optimal investment is 𝐼∗ > 𝐼𝐹𝐵  and diversification is𝑁
∗ > 𝑁𝐹𝐵.  ∎    
Proof  of Lemma 3:  
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This Lemma is eventually a direct implication of propositions 1 and 2. What we stress in this section is 
that the introduction of risk actually strengthens the urge of the overconfident CEO to overinvest and 
not the opposite. In this specification, the return on each project, 𝑅(𝐼; 𝑧), is a function of the investment 
level and an exogenous normally distributed productivity parameter (shock) 𝑧 ~ 𝑁(1, 𝜎𝑟
2), that is 
𝑅(𝐼; 𝑧) = 𝑧𝑅(𝐼) where 𝑅(𝐼) is increasing in the investment level (𝑅′(𝐼) > 0) and exhibits diminishing 
returns (𝑅′′(𝐼) < 0). Therefore, investing on the same project increases returns although at a 
diminishing level. Overconfident CEOs have a distorted view of project returns and their perception ?̂? 
of the true parameter 𝑧 is distributed as ?̂?  ~ 𝑁(1 + ∆, 𝜎2) where ∆ > 0 and 𝜎2 < 𝜎𝑟
2. All projects are 
uncorrelated even though the results still apply to any degree of positively correlated projects suggesting 
that the perceived return of every project for an overconfident CEO is distributed 
as 𝑅(𝐼; 𝑧)~𝑁(𝑅(𝐼)(1 + ∆), 𝑅2(𝐼)𝜎2). Thus, consistent with Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) the 
overconfident CEO either overestimate the mean return (∆ > 0) or underestimate the variance of each 
project (expect lower 𝜎2 < 𝜎𝑟
2), or a combination of the two. 
The CEO solves the following constrained optimization problem: 
 max
{𝐼,𝑠′,𝑐,𝑑,𝑁}
𝑠
𝑠 + 𝑠′
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑 −
𝜙
2
𝑁[𝑅(𝐼)]2𝜎2] (A36) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.      
𝑠′
𝑠 + 𝑠′
[𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑁𝑅(𝐼) − 𝑐 − 𝑑 −
𝜙
2
𝑁[𝑅(𝐼)]2𝜎𝑟
2] = 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑 (A37) 
 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶, 𝑑 ≤ 𝐷, 𝑐 + 𝑑 ≤ 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) (A38) 
 𝑐 ≥ 0, 𝑑 ≥ 0, 𝑁 ≥ 0 (A39) 
A rational CEO is not concerned about the financing method, adhering to the Modigliani-Miller theorem 
as before. However, overconfident CEOs seeking finance through the capital market face a conflict. 
Plug the constraint (A37) in the objective (A36) eliminating the number of shares 𝑠 to get: 
 
max
{𝐼,𝑠′,𝑐,𝑑,𝑁}
{𝐴 + 𝐶 +𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1 + Δ) − 𝑐 − 𝑑 −
𝜙
2
𝑁[𝑅(𝐼)]2𝜎2
− (𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑)𝑃𝑠} 
(A40) 
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Where 𝑃𝑠 =
𝐴+𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)(1+Δ)−𝑐−𝑑−
𝜙
2
𝑁[𝑅(𝐼)]2𝜎2
𝐴+𝐶+𝑁𝑅(𝐼)−𝑐−𝑑−
𝜙
2
𝑁[𝑅(𝐼)]2𝜎𝑟
2
  . The price 𝑃𝑠 ≥ 1 is the price the CEO needs to pay for 
each dollar of external funding from new shareholders for the amount they provide, 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 −
𝑑. For a rational CEO (∆= 0, 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑟
2), 𝑃𝑠 = 1 which implies that the financing method is irrelevant, 
as both 𝑐, 𝑑 drop out of the objective function (A40). However, for an overconfident CEO (∆> 0, 𝜎2 <
𝜎𝑟
2) that needs 𝑁𝐼 + 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝑐 − 𝑑 dollars from external investors, the price 𝑃𝑠 is greater than 1. The 
incentive of the overconfident CEO to diversify diminishes by the increase in the perceived cost of 
external financing. The overconfident CEO then optimally uses all the available cash 𝑐 = 𝐶 and thus 
higher 𝐶 guarantees that the overconfident CEO depends less on external funding. Thus, the greater the 
cash available to the CEO, the greater would be the scale of diversification. An overconfident manager 
that needs external funding would keep issuance of new shares as moderate as possible holding 
diversification to a minimum while an overconfident manager with the ability of undertaking the entire 
new investment through internal funding would be in favour of higher diversification. Thus, equity 
dependent firms that consider diversification are more cash sensitive than any other firm. In the previous 
sections we demonstrated that an increase in ∆ increases 𝑃𝑠 which lowers the appetite for external 
financing and thus induces the Cash Rich firms to diversify more. For an overconfident, lower 𝜎2 
produces the exact same effect on 𝑃𝑠 as ∆. Therefore, if the overconfident differs from the rational by 
either a positive ∆ or a lower 𝜎2 (as 𝜎2 < 𝜎𝑟
2), the aversion to external financing works precisely the 
same way. The difference between cash-rich and cash-poor firms is governed by how CEO’s perceive 
𝑃𝑠 and the overconfident - either by overestimating the mean return or underestimating the variance - 
believe they compensate outside investors with a price 𝑃𝑠 > 1 for each dollar they bring in the company.  
To conclude, the introduction of risk actually makes the risk neutral case more prominent. Risk 
can only alter the result if there are constraints on the amount the firm can borrow, and that constraint 
binds. Only then risk can potentially reverse the result and more details can be also provided upon 
request.  
 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
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 In this section, we illustrate the effect on diversification a period in advance, when CEOs receive 
feedback from the investment and diversification decisions of the past. In the second period, the current 
manager becomes aware of the forecasting mistakes21, if any, of the previous period and acts 
accordingly.  We assume that there is uncertainty in the model as in Lemma 3 and thus 𝑅𝑡~𝑁(?̅?, 𝜎
2). 
The overconfident22 CEO starts the period with a distorted belief about the true return. The current 
manager is not necessarily the manager that took the diversification decision in the previous period as 
there is high turnover in CEO positions. However, taking corrective measures for past CEO’s 
investments might be important for the newly hired CEO as there can be pressure from the board for 
such corrective measures. The CEO23 is provided with some feedback about the true returns of the 
project and needs to revise her estimate about the returns of the diversification decisions of the past. 
We assume that the current manager, overconfident or not, updates her beliefs according to the 
following recursive algorithm (as in Evans and Honkapohja (2012)): 
 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛾𝑡(𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑒) (A41) 
The variable 𝑅𝑡
𝑒 is the expected return for period 𝑡 given the information up to 𝑡 + 1. The above 
recursive algorithm states that once a diversification decision is made, given the feedback from the true 
returns, the update of the CEO’s forecast 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒  is equal to the realized return 𝑅𝑡 plus a weight 0 < 𝛾𝑡 <
1 of the difference between the anticipated return the previous period 𝑅𝑡
𝑒 and the true return for that 
period. A direct implication from propositions 1 and 2 is that the lower the expected return is 𝑅𝑡
𝑒, the 
lower the diversification investment undertaken. Thus, if 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒 < 𝑅𝑡
𝑒, the company is going to refocus. 
If the belief in the first period is that the return is 𝑅𝑡
𝑒 = (1 − ∆)?̅?, then from (A41), the probability to 
refocus is: Pr(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒 < 𝑅𝑡
𝑒) = Φ(
∆?̅?
𝜎
), where Φ(. ) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard 
normal. Clearly, when ∆= 0, Pr(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒 < 𝑅𝑡
𝑒) = Φ(0) = 1/2. If the CEO in the initial period is 
                                                          
21 CEOs are forced to react to failed diversifications because of pressure from shareholders for corrective 
measures as failure to respond can possibly harm their human capital. 
22 Albeit, the refocusing activity for overconfident CEOs should be much higher following the reasoning in Roll 
(1986) and Camerer and Lovallo (1999), those are the CEOs who have been engaged more intensively into 
unsuccessful diversification activities in the first place. 
23 albeit CEOs are capable of learning, in real world situations the overconfident CEO would never turn into a 
rational one. Learning can turn an overconfident CEO into a rational only when time approaches infinity and if 
the overconfident is fed with projects that are identical to the initial one. 
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overconfident and thus ∆> 0, then Pr(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒 < 𝑅𝑡
𝑒) = Φ(
∆?̅?
𝜎
) > 1/2 implying that it is more likely the 
diversification to be reversed (refocusing) if it was initiated by an overconfident CEO. ∎ 
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Appendix B. Definitions and measurement of variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variables  
EXC_VAL Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s market 
value to the imputed value. Market value is the sum of the market value 
of equity and the book value of debt. The imputed value is the sum of 
the segments’ imputed values, obtained by multiplying each segment’s 
sales with the median of the market value-to-sales ratio computed using 
only single-business firms in the same industry.  
REF_EVENT Corporate refocusing decision is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
the number of business segments reported decrease relative to the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise.  
DIV_EVENT Corporate diversification decision is a dummy variable that equals 1 
when the number of segments reported increase relative to the previous 
year, and 0 otherwise.  
NUM_SEGS The number of business segments.  
CEO overconfidence measures 
NET_BUYER_OC Net buyer CEO overconfidence following Malmendier and Tate (2005): 
CEOs are classified as overconfident during their entire tenure if they 
were net buyers of firm equity during their first five years in our sample, 
that is, if they bought stock on net in more years than they sold on net 
during their first five sample years. 
PRESS_OC Press portrayal CEO overconfidence following Hirshleifer et al. (2012): 
hand collected data based on CEO coverage in the business and financial 
press  CEOs are classified as overconfident when the number of articles 
that characterize CEOs as confident or optimistic is greater than the 
number of articles characterizing CEOs as reliable, cautious, 
conservative, practical, frugal, or steady. 
Diversification and firm characteristic variables  
DIV A dummy variable that equals 1 for a diversified firm, both before and 
after the diversification, and zero otherwise.  
BEF_DIV A dummy that equals 1 for the years before a firm diversifies for the first 
time, and zero otherwise. 
AFT_DIV A dummy that equals 1 for all years following the first instance of 
diversification, and zero otherwise. 
PAST_DIV A dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm makes a diversification at 
least once in the period t-3 to t-1, and 0 otherwise.  
PAST_DIV_CEO_OC A dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm makes a diversification in 
the period from year t-3 to t-1 and at least one diversification event was 
made by an overconfident CEO, and 0 otherwise.  
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PAST_DIV_CEO_NOT_OC A dummy that equals 1 when a firm makes a diversification in the period 
from year t-3 to t-1 and all past diversification events were made by a 
rational CEO, and 0 otherwise. 
CASH_POOR A dummy variable that equals 1 when the residuals of the Opler, 
Pinkowitz, and Williamson (1999) corporate cash model are negative, 
and zero otherwise. 
CASH_RICH A dummy variable that equals 1 when the residuals of the Opler, 
Pinkowitz, and Williamson (1999) corporate cash model are positive, 
and zero otherwise 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. 
INVEST The ratio of capital expenditures to total sales. 
PROFIT The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total sales. 
LEV The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
POST_ACQUISITION A dummy variable that equals 1 for the years after an acquisition is 
made, and 0 otherwise. 
VEGA The natural logarithm of one plus the change in the risk-neutral value of 
the CEO’s portfolio of stock options for a 1% change in the standard 
deviation of the return of the underlying stock. 
DELTA The natural logarithm of the change in the risk-neutral value of the 
CEO’s portfolio of stock and stock options for a 1% change in the price 
of the return of the underlying stock. 
RET Past one-year stock performance computed from monthly returns. 
TENURE The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the CEO sits in 
office. 
TOTAL MENTION The number of articles mentioning the CEO. 
NUM_SEGS_HIRING The number of segments during the year of CEO hiring. For hiring prior 
to 1960 we use the number of segments of the year 1960. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of key variables for overconfident and rational CEO firm-years. The 
sample covers firm–year observations with non-missing values from 1993 to 2010 and meets sample selection 
criteria described in the text. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The equality of means (medians) is 
tested using a t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank statistic). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Only mean values are reported for dummy variables. 
 
OVERCONFIDENCE 
MEASURE 
 
NET BUYER 
(NET_BUYER_OC) 
PRESS-BASED 
(PRESS_OC) 
  
Overconfident 
firm–year 
observations 
Rational 
firm–year 
observations 
Difference: 
(Overconfident 
– Rational) 
Overconfident 
firm–year 
observations 
Rational 
firm–year 
observations 
Difference: 
(Overconfident 
– Rational) 
SIZE 
Mean 
Median 
7.211 
7.060 
6.809 
6.670 
0.402*** 
0.390*** 
8.303 
8.328 
6.672 
6.574 
1.630*** 
1.754*** 
INVEST 
Mean 
Median 
0.085 
0.045 
0.100 
0.047 
-0.015*** 
-0.002*** 
0.075 
0.048 
0.091 
0.045 
-0.016*** 
0.003** 
PROFIT 
Mean 
Median 
0.103 
0.095 
0.097 
0.099 
0.006* 
-0.004 
0.081 
0.096 
0.094 
0.091 
-0.013*** 
0.005 
CASH_POOR 
Mean 
 
0.483 
 
0.428 
 
0.055*** 
 
0.411 
 
0.455 
 
-0.045*** 
 
VEGA 
Mean 
Median 
3.718 
3.839 
3.235 
3.468 
0.483*** 
0.371*** 
4.347 
4.679 
3.152 
3.359 
1.196*** 
1.320*** 
DETLA 
Mean 
Median 
5.154 
5.166 
5.822 
5.790 
-0.668*** 
-0.624*** 
6.049 
6.063 
5.063 
5.097 
0.986*** 
0.966*** 
RET 
Mean 
Median 
-0.028 
0.015 
-0.048 
-0.009 
0.019 
0.024* 
-0.025 
0.015 
-0.049 
-0.002 
0.023 
0.017 
TENURE 
Mean 
Median 
1.733 
1.720 
2.246 
2.303 
-0.513*** 
-0.583*** 
2.018 
2.058 
1.854 
1.832 
0.164*** 
0.226 
MENTION 
Mean 
Median 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
3.686 
2.000 
0.382 
0.000 
3.304*** 
2.000*** 
EXC_VAL 
Mean 
Median 
0.121 
0.100 
0.247 
0.205 
-0.126*** 
-0.105*** 
0.197 
0.157 
0.154 
0.121 
0.044*** 
0.036*** 
REF_EVENT Mean 0.041 0.026 0.014*** 0.044 0.037 0.007 
DIV_EVENT Mean 0.045 0.034 0.011** 0.057 0.040 0.017*** 
No. of obs.  4,602 3,660  1,822 9,021  
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TABLE 2 
 
Analysis of Excess Value on CEO Overconfidence 
 
This table displays regression analysis of the relation between excess value and CEO overconfidence. The sample 
consists of all single-segment and diversified firms during the period 1993-2010 that meet sample selection criteria 
as described in the text. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Panels A and B present multivariate regression 
analysis of excess value on overconfidence using the net buyer (NET_BUYER_OC) and press-based 
(PRESS_OC) measures, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Excess Value on CEO Overconfidence based on the net buyer measure (NET_BUYER_OCt-1) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value (EXC_VALt) 
 Single and Multi-segment Firms Multi-segment Firms only   
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Const. 
-0.241 
(-0.63) 
-0.239 
(-0.63) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.01) 
0.086 
(0.10) 
 
DIV 
-0.120** 
(-2.30) 
     
DIV X CEO_OC  
-0.141** 
(-2.13) 
    
DIV X CEO_NOT_OC  
-0.103 
(-1.57) 
    
AFT_DIV 
-0.141** 
(-2.22) 
  
-0.099 
(-1.56) 
  
AFT_DIV X CEO_OC  
-0.214** 
(-2.44) 
  
-0.195** 
(-2.53) 
 
AFT_DIV X CEO_NOT_OC  
-0.073 
(-0.91) 
  
-0.011 
(-0.15) 
 
SIZEt 
0.543*** 
(4.74) 
0.540*** 
(4.71) 
 
0.244 
(0.94) 
0.210 
(0.80) 
 
INVESTt 
0.057 
(0.68) 
0.056 
(0.67) 
 
0.408 
(1.23) 
0.416 
(1.33) 
 
PROFITt 
0.143 
(1.19) 
0.141 
(1.17) 
 
1.311*** 
(3.85) 
1.284*** 
(3.69) 
 
SIZEt-1 
-0.244*** 
(-5.08) 
-0.244*** 
(-5.05) 
 
-0.194 
(-1.46) 
-0.192 
(-1.43) 
 
INVESTt-1 
-0.123* 
(-1.81) 
-0.123* 
(-1.81) 
 
0.551 
(1.44) 
0.561 
(1.47) 
 
PROFITt-1  
-0.020** 
(-2.17) 
-0.020** 
(-2.18) 
 
-0.267 
(-0.88) 
-0.275 
(-0.92) 
 
SIZEt-2 
-0.198*** 
(-5.08) 
-0.197*** 
(-5.03) 
 
-0.129 
(-1.30) 
-0.124 
(-1.23) 
 
INVESTt-2 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
 
0.717** 
(2.39) 
0.707** 
(2.37) 
 
PROFITt-2 
-0.035 
(-1.26) 
-0.034 
(-1.25) 
 
0.055 
(0.19) 
0.052 
(0.18) 
 
LEVt 
-0.238** 
(-2.38) 
-0.229** 
(-2.29) 
 
-0.149 
(-0.69) 
-0.092 
(-0.43) 
 
SIZEt
2 -0.004 
(-0.57) 
-0.004 
(-0.55) 
 
0.009 
(0.54) 
0.011 
(0.65) 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
No. of firms 569 569  139 139  
No. of obs. 3,717 3,717  711 711  
Adj-R2 0.1056 0.1076  0.1959 0.2056  
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Panel B: Excess Value on CEO Overconfidence based on the press-based measure (PRESS_OCt-1) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value (EXC_VALt) 
 Single and Multi-segment Firms Multi-segment Firms only   
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Const. 
-0.326 
(-1.04) 
-0.332 
(-1.06) 
 
-0.445 
(-0.64) 
-0.444 
(-0.63) 
 
DIV 
-0.063 
(-1.43) 
     
DIV X CEO_OC  
0.002 
(0.02) 
    
DIV X CEO_NOT_OC  
-0.075 
(-1.60) 
    
AFT_DIV 
-0.162*** 
(-2.98) 
  
-0.123** 
(-2.31) 
  
AFT_DIV X CEO_OC  
-0.272*** 
(-2.79) 
  
-0.178* 
(-1.96) 
 
AFT_DIV X CEO_NOT_OC  
-0.147** 
(-2.55) 
  
-0.119** 
(-2.12) 
 
SIZEt 
0.562*** 
(5.87) 
0.566*** 
(5.90) 
 
0.370* 
(1.67) 
0.368* 
(1.65) 
 
INVESTt 
0.060 
(0.67) 
0.060 
(0.68) 
 
0.765** 
(2.46) 
0.764** 
(2.46) 
 
PROFITt 
0.188* 
(1.76) 
0.188* 
(1.76) 
 
0.678*** 
(2.91) 
0.676*** 
(2.91) 
 
SIZEt-1 
-0.243*** 
(-5.53) 
-0.243*** 
(-5.54) 
 
-0.276** 
(-2.38) 
-0.274** 
(-2.37) 
 
INVESTt-1 
0.027 
(0.30) 
0.028 
(0.31) 
 
0.103 
(0.43) 
0.099 
(0.41) 
 
PROFITt-1  
-0.006 
(-0.52) 
-0.006 
(-0.52) 
 
0.267 
(1.56) 
0.268 
(1.57) 
 
SIZEt-2 
-0.200*** 
(-6.54) 
-0.200*** 
(-6.55) 
 
-0.059 
(-0.78) 
-0.060 
(-0.80) 
 
INVESTt-2 
-0.080* 
(-1.85) 
-0.079* 
(-1.85) 
 
0.351 
(1.12) 
0.353 
(1.13) 
 
PROFITt-2 
-0.048** 
(-2.24) 
-0.048** 
(-2.24) 
 
-0.025 
(-0.12) 
-0.026 
(-0.13) 
 
LEVt 
-0.192** 
(-2.48) 
-0.192** 
(-2.47) 
 
-0.095 
(-0.52) 
-0.098 
(-0.54) 
 
SIZEt
2 
-0.006 
(-0.90) 
-0.006 
(-0.95) 
 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
No. of firms 884 884  183 183  
No. of obs. 5,002 5,002  939 939  
Adj-R2 0.1087 0.109  0.1769 0.1771  
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TABLE 3 
 
Analysis of Excess Value on CEO Overconfidence: Additional evidence 
 
This table displays additional analysis of the relation between excess value and CEO overconfidence. The sample 
consists of all single-segment and diversified firms during the period 1993-2010 that meet sample selection criteria 
as described in the text. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Panels A and B present multivariate regression 
analysis of excess value on overconfidence using the net buyer (NET_BUYER_OC) and press-based 
(PRESS_OC) measures, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Excess Value on CEO Overconfidence based on the net buyer measure (NET_BUYER_OCt-1) 
 
  Dependent Variable: Excess Value (EXC_VALt)  
 Single and Multi-segment Firms Multi-segment Firms only 
 
Berger and 
Ofek (1995) 
Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) 
Campa and 
Kedia (2002) 
Berger and 
Ofek (1995) 
Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) 
Campa and 
Kedia (2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Const. 
-0.270 
(-0.7) 
-0.138 
(-0.34) 
-0.094 
(-0.59) 
0.086 
(0.10) 
0.944 
(1.22) 
0.376 
(0.55) 
DIV X CEO_OC 
-0.133** 
(-1.99) 
-0.158** 
(-2.13) 
-0.020 
(-0.62)   
 
DIV X CEO_NOT_OC 
-0.098 
(-1.48) 
-0.086 
(-1.27) 
-0.028 
(-0.85)   
 
AFT_DIV X CEO_OC 
-0.211** 
(-2.42) 
-0.158** 
(-2.13) 
-0.111** 
(-2.43) 
-0.196** 
(-2.54) 
-0.289*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.112** 
(-2.52) 
AFT_DIV X CEO_NOT_OC 
-0.063 
(-0.78) 
-0.086 
(-1.27) 
-0.047 
(-0.84) 
-0.012 
(-0.16) 
-0.037 
(-0.42) 
-0.034 
(-0.63) 
SIZEt 
0.567*** 
(4.90) 
0.526*** 
(4.16) 
0.339*** 
(5.63) 
0.209 
(0.79) 
0.121 
(0.52) 
0.134 
(0.51) 
INVESTt 
0.052 
(0.63) 
0.139 
(1.56) 
0.043 
(0.86) 
0.419 
(1.32) 
0.192 
(0.58) 
0.144 
(0.41) 
PROFITt 
0.142 
(1.16) 
0.138 
(0.93) 
0.016 
(0.27) 
1.285*** 
(3.72) 
1.436*** 
(3.99) 
0.363 
(0.99) 
SIZEt-1 
-0.244*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.296*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.522*** 
(-8.77) 
-0.192 
(-1.43) 
-0.246* 
(-1.71) 
-0.687*** 
(-3.20) 
INVESTt-1 
-0.128* 
(-1.91) 
-0.146* 
(-1.88) 
-0.092* 
(-1.8) 
0.562 
(1.48) 
0.786** 
(2.00) 
-0.289 
(-0.66) 
PROFITt-1  
-0.020** 
(-2.28) 
-0.023* 
(-1.78) 
0.042 
(0.59) 
-0.277 
(-0.94) 
-0.492 
(-1.48) 
0.157 
(0.48) 
SIZEt-2 
-0.202*** 
(-5.19) 
-0.177*** 
(-4.41) 
0.204*** 
(5.93) 
-0.124 
(-1.23) 
-0.199* 
(-1.71) 
0.397*** 
(4.16) 
INVESTt-2 
-0.006 
(-0.1) 
0.087 
(1.30) 
-0.008 
(-0.18) 
0.708** 
(2.37) 
0.978*** 
(2.84) 
0.432 
(1.36) 
PROFITt-2 
-0.032 
(-1.19) 
-0.024 
(-0.49) 
0.012 
(0.39) 
0.052 
(0.18) 
0.358 
(1.04) 
-0.045 
(-0.18) 
LEVt 
-0.202** 
(-2.02) 
-0.482*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.033 
(-0.71) 
-0.095 
(-0.44) 
-0.400 
(-1.55) 
0.125 
(0.96) 
SIZEt
2 
-0.005 
(-0.71) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
0.011 
(0.66) 
0.025* 
(1.79) 
0.011 
(0.65) 
POST_ACQUISITION 
-0.068* 
(-1.75) 
 
 0.005 
(0.07) 
 
 
HHI 
 
 
-0.362* 
(-1.8)  
 
-0.833* 
(-1.74) 
EXC_VAL t-1 
 
 
0.507*** 
(18.38)  
 
0.546*** 
(9.75) 
EXC_VAL t-2 
 
 
0.189*** 
(9.64)  
 
0.139*** 
(2.73) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firms 569 562 410 139 136 92 
No. of obs. 3,717 3,653 2,870 711 689 480 
Adj-R2 0.118 0.124 0.603 0.206 0.254 0.581 
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Panel B: Excess Value on CEO Overconfidence based on the press-based measure (PRESS_OCt-1) 
  Dependent Variable: Excess Value (EXC_VALt)  
 
Single and Multi-segment 
Firms 
 
Multi-segment Firms only 
 
 
Berger and 
Ofek (1995) 
Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) 
Kampa and 
Kedia (2002) 
Berger and 
Ofek (1995) 
Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) 
Kampa and 
Kedia (2002) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Const. 
-0.376 
(-1.20) 
-0.215 
(-0.66) 
-0.202 
(-1.50) 
-0.439 
(-0.62) 
-0.032 
(-0.05) 
-0.067 
(-0.15) 
DIV X CEO_OC 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
-0.062 
(-0.84) 
-0.058 
(-1.13)   
 
DIV X CEO_NOT_OC 
-0.068 
(-1.44) 
-0.064 
(-1.26) 
-0.014 
(-0.63)   
 
AFT_DIV X CEO_OC 
-0.270*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.251*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.064* 
(-1.95) 
-0.179* 
(-1.95) 
-0.188* 
(-1.90) 
-0.069 
(-1.05) 
AFT_DIV X CEO_NOT_OC 
-0.141** 
(-2.45) 
-0.195*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.020 
(-0.30) 
-0.117** 
(-2.09) 
-0.159** 
(-2.36) 
-0.048 
(-1.43) 
SIZEt 
0.603*** 
(6.29) 
0.518*** 
(5.07) 
0.356*** 
(7.13) 
0.375* 
(1.68) 
0.309 
(1.41) 
0.276 
(1.6) 
INVESTt 
0.053 
(0.60) 
0.152* 
(1.70) 
0.118** 
(2.32) 
0.744** 
(2.37) 
0.597 
(1.56) 
0.189 
(0.6) 
PROFITt 
0.183* 
(1.70) 
0.213 
(1.63) 
0.057 
(1.10) 
0.669*** 
(2.90) 
0.899*** 
(2.87) 
0.188 
(1.03) 
SIZEt-1 
-0.246*** 
(-5.62) 
-0.259*** 
(-5.29) 
-0.517*** 
(-9.92) 
-0.276** 
(-2.38) 
-0.274** 
(-2.10) 
-0.550*** 
(4.11) 
INVESTt-1 
0.025 
(0.27) 
0.045 
(0.50) 
-0.114** 
(2.27) 
0.101 
(0.41) 
0.285 
(1.16) 
-0.671* 
(-1.94) 
PROFITt-1  
-0.006 
(-0.54) 
-0.006 
(-0.45) 
0.006 
(0.08) 
0.269 
(1.59) 
0.260 
(1.06) 
0.199 
(1.26) 
SIZEt-2 
-0.208*** 
(-6.84) 
-0.190*** 
(-5.90) 
0.211*** 
(7.48) 
-0.062 
(-0.81) 
-0.117 
(-1.34) 
0.225*** 
(3.36) 
INVESTt-2 
-0.088** 
(-2.05) 
-0.063 
(-1.22) 
-0.040 
(-1.22) 
0.355 
(1.14) 
0.613* 
(1.74) 
0.527** 
(1.99) 
PROFITt-2 
-0.047** 
(-2.16) 
-0.042 
(-1.36) 
0.069 
(1.24) 
-0.025 
(-0.12) 
-0.020 
(-0.08) 
-0.152 
(-1.00) 
LEVt 
-0.168** 
(-2.16) 
-0.456*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.026 
(-0.8) 
-0.088 
(-0.47) 
-0.416* 
(-1.93) 
0.012 
(0.11) 
SIZEt
2 
-0.008 
(-1.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.94) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.008 
(0.65) 
0.004 
(0.40) 
POST_ACQUISITION 
-0.080** 
(-2.50) 
 
 -0.024 
(-0.38) 
 
 
HHI 
-0.080** 
(-2.50) 
 
-0.174 
(-1.01) 
-0.024 
(-0.38) 
 
-0.370 
(-0.83) 
EXC_VAL t-1 
-0.080** 
(-2.50) 
 
0.508*** 
(24.02) 
-0.024 
(-0.38) 
 
0.500*** 
(8.62) 
EXC_VAL t-2 
-0.080** 
(-2.50) 
 
0.170*** 
(11.11) 
-0.024 
(-0.38) 
 
0.137*** 
(3.44) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firms 884 869 814 183 179 161 
No. of obs. 5,002 4,894 4,470 939 907 770 
Adj-R2 0.113 0.120 0.583 0.1775 0.207 0.5528 
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TABLE 4 
 
Analysis of Corporate Refocusing Decision and Past Diversification Decisions 
 
This table displays logistic regression analysis of the relation between corporate refocusing decisions and past diversification decisions. The 
sample consists of all multi-segment firms (i.e. firms that potentially could refocus) and firms that refocused either to multi-segment firm or 
to single segment firm included in both Compustat Industrial Segment and Compustat Industrial Annual databases during the period 1993-
2010 that meet sample selection criteria as described in the text. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Corporate Refocusing Decision (REF_EVENTt) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 
MEASURE 
NET BUYER 
(NET_BUYER_OCt-1) 
PRESS-BASED 
(PRESS_OCt-1) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CONSTANT 
-3.104*** 
(-4.20) 
-3.139*** 
(-4.24) 
-3.281*** 
(-5.30) 
-3.068*** 
(-4.83) 
PAST_DIV 
0.511** 
(2.55) 
 
0.490*** 
(2.95) 
 
PAST_DIV_CEO_OC  
0.721*** 
(3.34) 
 
0.863*** 
(3.42) 
PAST_DIV_CEO_NOT_OC  
0.037 
(0.13) 
 
0.350* 
(1.91) 
CASH_POORt-1 
-0.050 
(-0.26) 
-0.061 
(-0.31) 
-0.099 
(-0.60) 
-0.059 
(-0.36) 
INVESTt-1 
1.639* 
(1.72) 
1.836* 
(1.93) 
1.940** 
(2.18) 
1.972** 
(2.23) 
PROFITt-1 
-1.177* 
(-1.67) 
-1.369* 
(-1.93) 
-0.770 
(-1.39) 
-0.715 
(-1.29) 
SIZEt-1 
0.179** 
(2.02) 
0.158* 
(1.78) 
0.251*** 
(3.19) 
0.234*** 
(2.94) 
VEGAt-1 
0.136* 
(1.70) 
0.121 
(1.52) 
0.087 
(1.26) 
0.076 
(1.10) 
DELTAt-1 
-0.151* 
(-1.73) 
-0.097 
(-1.09) 
-0.185** 
(-2.50) 
-0.186** 
(-2.53) 
RETt-1 
-0.382** 
(-2.31) 
-0.408** 
(-2.42) 
-0.336** 
(-2.49) 
-0.337** 
(-2.51) 
TENUREt-1 
-0.334** 
(-2.40) 
-0.316** 
(-2.26) 
-0.230** 
(-2.13) 
-0.245** 
(-2.27) 
EXC_VAL t-1 
0.023 
(0.13) 
0.020 
(0.12) 
-0.092* 
(-1.73) 
-0.097 
(-0.67) 
TOTAL MENTION t-1   
-0.063* 
(-1.73) 
-0.084** 
(-2.17) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TEST I: 
PAST_DIV X CEO_OC - 
PAST_DIV X CEO_NOT_OC 
 
-0.684** 
(-2.38) 
 
-0.513* 
(-1.92) 
No. of firms 392 392 569 569 
No. of obs. 1,195 1,195 1,690 1,690 
-2 Log L 846.5 840.5 1179.5 1176.1 
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TABLE 5 
 
Analysis of Corporate Refocusing Decision and Past Diversification Decisions: Additional 
evidence 
 
This table displays logistic regression analysis of the relation between corporate refocusing decisions and past diversification decisions. The 
sample consists of all multi-segment firms (i.e. firms that potentially could refocus) and firms that refocused either to multi-segment firm or 
to single segment firm included in both Compustat Industrial Segment and Compustat Industrial Annual databases during the period 1993-
2010 that meet sample selection criteria as described in the text. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Corporate Refocusing Decision (REF_EVENTt) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 
MEASURE 
NET BUYER 
(NET_BUYER_OCt-1) 
PRESS-BASED 
(PRESS_OCt-1) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CONSTANT 
-3.132*** 
(-4.23) 
-3.223*** 
(-3.41) 
-3.169*** 
(-4.95) 
-3.083*** 
(-3.40) 
PAST_DIV_CEO_OC 
0.720*** 
(3.33) 
0.572** 
(2.20) 
0.876*** 
(3.47) 
0.947*** 
(2.69) 
PAST_DIV_CEO_NOT_OC 
0.037 
(0.13) 
-0.096 
(-0.27) 
0.345 
(1.39) 
0.025 
(0.51) 
CASH_POORt-1 
-0.061 
(-0.31) 
0.046 
(0.19) 
-0.062 
(-0.38) 
0.121 
(0.54) 
INVESTt-1 
1.829* 
(1.92) 
1.278 
(1.12) 
2.043** 
(2.29) 
1.458 
(1.23) 
PROFITt-1 
-1.368* 
(-1.93) 
-1.358 
(-1.45) 
-0.720 
(-1.30) 
-1.028 
(-1.20) 
SIZEt-1 
0.158* 
(1.78) 
0.155 
(1.41) 
0.231*** 
(2.89) 
0.198* 
(1.76) 
VEGAt-1 
0.121 
(1.51) 
0.200* 
(1.94) 
0.078 
(1.14) 
0.212** 
(2.02) 
DELTAt-1 
-0.098 
(-1.09) 
-0.112 
(-0.97) 
-0.174** 
(-2.36) 
-0.150 
(-1.35) 
RETt-1 
-0.408** 
(-2.41) 
-0.375* 
(-1.80) 
-0.327** 
(-2.44) 
-0.236 
(-1.25) 
TENUREt-1 
-0.315** 
(-2.26) 
-0.279 
(-1.31) 
-0.245** 
(-2.31) 
-0.406** 
(-2.19) 
EXC_VAL t-1 
0.019 
(0.11) 
-0.229 
(-1.02) 
-0.085 
(-0.59) 
0.021 
(0.10) 
TOTAL MENTION t-1   
-0.087** 
(-2.21) 
-0.131** 
(-2.29) 
CEO_CHANGE t-1 
-0.051 
(-0.18) 
 
0.291 
(1.58) 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TEST I: 
PAST_DIV X CEO_OC - 
PAST_DIV X CEO_NOT_OC 
-0.683** 
(-2.37) 
-0.668* 
(-1.85) 
-0.531** 
(-1.99) 
-0.922** 
(-2.34) 
No. of firms 392 340 569 433 
No. of obs. 1,195 916 1,690 1123 
-2 Log L 840.5 601.6 1174.0 707.1 
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TABLE 6 
 
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Diversification Decisions 
 
This table presents logistic regression coefficient estimates of the relation between corporate diversification decisions and CEO 
overconfidence. The sample consists of firms included in both Compustat Industrial Segment and Compustat Industrial Annual databases 
during the period 1993-2010 that meet sample selection criteria as described in the text. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Corporate Diversification Decision (DIV_EVENTt) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 
MEASURE 
NET BUYER 
(NET_BUYER_OCt-1) 
PRESS-BASED 
(PRESS_OCt-1)  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CONSTANT 
-5.511*** 
(-9.51) 
-5.628*** 
(-9.55) 
-5.373*** 
(-9.83) 
-5.384*** 
(-9.84) 
CEO_OC 
0.369** 
(2.45) 
 
0.512*** 
(3.09) 
 
CASH_POOR 
0.051 
(0.38) 
0.259 
(1.23) 
-0.083 
(-0.75) 
-0.043 
(-0.34) 
CEO_OC X 
CASH RICH 
 
0.541*** 
(2.65) 
 
0.584*** 
(2.93) 
CEO_OC X 
CASH POOR 
 
0.196 
(1.01) 
 
0.420* 
(1.88) 
INVESTt-1 
-1.577** 
(-2.53) 
-1.576** 
(-2.53) 
-1.767*** 
(-3.06) 
-1.789*** 
(-3.09) 
PROFITt-1 
-0.682* 
(-1.94) 
-0.682* 
(-1.93) 
-0.112 
(-0.31) 
-0.109 
(-0.30) 
SIZEt-1 
0.110* 
(1.88) 
0.112* 
(1.92) 
0.065 
(1.25) 
0.064 
(1.23) 
VEGAt-1 
0.033 
(0.66) 
0.034 
(0.67) 
0.055 
(1.33) 
0.056 
(1.35) 
DELTAt-1 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
-0.006 
(-0.10) 
-0.024 
(-0.52) 
-0.025 
(-0.54) 
RETt-1 
-0.091 
(-0.78) 
-0.101 
(-0.86) 
-0.083 
(-0.87) 
-0.082 
(-0.86) 
TENUREt-1 
0.032 
(0.34) 
0.036 
(0.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
EXC_VAL t-1 
-0.404*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.405*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.357*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.353*** 
(-3.58) 
TOTAL MENTION t-1   
-0.016 
(-0.56) 
-0.015 
(-0.55) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firms 1,360 1,360 1,860 1,860 
No. of obs. 8,262 8,262 10,843 10,843 
-2 Log L 2,197.8 2,196.3 3,179.9 3,179.6 
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TABLE 7 
 
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Diversification Decisions: Additional evidence 
 
This table presents logistic regression coefficient estimates of the relation between corporate diversification decisions and CEO 
overconfidence. The sample consists of firms included in both Compustat Industrial Segment and Compustat Industrial Annual databases 
during the period 1993-2010 that meet sample selection criteria as described in the text. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 
Corporate Diversification 
Decision (DIV_EVENTt) 
Number of 
Segments 
(NUM_SEGSt) 
Corporate Diversification 
Decision (DIV_EVENTt) 
Number of 
Segments 
(NUM_SEGSt) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 
MEASURE 
NET BUYER 
(NET_BUYER_OCt-1) 
PRESS-BASED 
(PRESS_OCt-1)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Data/Model 
treatments 
Excluding year 
1998 
Single 
segment firms 
and 
diversification 
incidences 
from single 
segment firm 
status 
Ordinal 
regression 
with Number 
of Segments as 
dependent 
variable 
Excluding year 
1998 
Single 
segment firms 
and 
diversification 
incidences 
from single 
segment firm 
status 
Ordinal 
regression 
with Number 
of Segments as 
dependent 
variable 
CONSTANT/S 
-5.027*** 
(-7.21) 
-5.985*** 
(-7.55) 
YES 
-5.126*** 
(-8.17) 
-6.183*** 
(-7.33) 
YES 
CEO_OC 
0.470* 
(1.75) 
0.213 
(0.83) 
0.030 
(0.34) 
-0.119 
(-0.73) 
0.063 
(0.42) 
-0.043 
(-0.77) 
CASH_POOR 
0.603** 
(2.31) 
0.525** 
(2.03) 
0.406*** 
(4.92) 
0.803*** 
(3.33) 
0.616** 
(2.39) 
0.248*** 
(2.61) 
CEO_OC X 
CASH RICH 
0.027 
(0.10) 
0.352 
(1.45) 
0.259*** 
(2.94) 
0.807*** 
(2.81) 
0.204 
(0.68) 
-0.092 
(-0.83) 
CEO_OC X 
CASH POOR 
-1.522* 
(-1.88) 
-2.174** 
(-2.21) 
-2.098 
(-7.33) 
-1.955** 
(-2.40) 
-2.628*** 
(-2.95) 
-2.381*** 
(-8.67) 
INVESTt-1 
-0.697* 
(-1.76) 
-0.646 
(-1.58) 
-0.594*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.135 
(-0.32) 
-0.014 
(-0.03) 
-0.388** 
(-2.34) 
PROFITt-1 
0.016 
(0.22) 
0.122* 
(1.68) 
0.061** 
(2.48) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
0.078 
(1.24) 
0.092*** 
(3.94) 
SIZEt-1 
0.009 
(0.14) 
-0.004 
(-0.06) 
-0.047** 
(-2.36) 
0.064 
(1.17) 
0.030 
(0.60) 
-0.027 
(-1.54) 
VEGAt-1 
0.042 
(0.58) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.065*** 
(2.79) 
-0.028 
(-0.48) 
-0.043 
(-0.79) 
0.029 
(1.45) 
DELTAt-1 
-0.227 
(-1.51) 
-0.264* 
(-1.71) 
-0.127** 
(-2.13) 
-0.127 
(-1.03) 
-0.219* 
(-1.80) 
-0.092* 
(-1.84) 
RETt-1 
-0.042 
(-0.35) 
0.134 
(1.07) 
0.314*** 
(7.50) 
-0.019 
(-0.19) 
0.146 
(1.53) 
0.273*** 
(7.73) 
TENUREt-1 
-0.497*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.412*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.306*** 
(-5.84) 
-0.403*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.265** 
(-2.20) 
-0.254*** 
(-5.53) 
EXC_VAL t-1    
-0.045 
(-1.15) 
-0.035 
(-0.90) 
-0.017 
(-1.36) 
NUM_SEGS_HIRING   
1.133*** 
(38.92) 
  
1.227*** 
(47.85) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Random effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
No. of firms 1,343 1,117 1,356 1,838 1,554 1,855 
No. of obs. 7,691 6,477 8,246 10,099 8,483 10,790 
-2 Log L 1,553.0 1,264.7 9,389.94 2,321.0 1,821.6 12,629.29 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Unconditional Probabilities of Corporate Diversification Decisions and CEO Overconfidence 
 
The figures provide evidence about the unconditional relation between corporate diversification decisions and CEO overconfidence. The year-
by-year frequencies are calculated separately for the group of overconfident and rational CEOs as the number of CEOs who pursue a corporate 
diversification decision divided by the total number of CEOs in each group in a given year. 
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